Court of Justice 23-02-1988 ECLI:EU:C:1988:84

Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mancini

delivered on 23 February 1988^(*)

Mr President,

Members of the Court,

By application dated 28 February 1986 the Commission of the European Communities has requested the Court to declare that, by adopting the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations, the United Kingdom has infringed the provisions of Council Directive 76/756/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the installation of lighting and light-signalling devices on motor vehicles and their trailers (Official Journal L 262, p. 1) and has therefore failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty of Rome.

Under the regulations motor vehicles may not, as from 1 April 1987, be approved and put into service unless they are equipped with ‘dim-dip’, a lighting device which, when the ignition is switched on, automatically increases the intensity of the position lamps previously installed but without reaching the levei of intensity of dipped-beam headlamps.

According to the United Kingdom, ‘dim-dip’ increases road safety. This view is disputed in numerous quarters. Whether it is right or wrong is, however, not the issue. The case which the Court is called upon to decide is concerned with the interpretation of the abovementioned directive, and in particular of Article 2, as amended by Directive 85/276/EEC of 26 May 1983 (Official Journal L 151, p. 47). That article provides that, as from 1 October 1977, ‘No Member State may... refuse, in respect to the type of vehicle, to grant EEC type-approval or national type-approval, or ... entry into service ... of vehicles, on grounds relating to the installation on the vehicles of the lighting and light-signalling devices, whether mandatory or optional, listed in items 1.5.7. to 1.5.20 of Annex I if these devices are installed in accordance with the requirements set out in Annex I.’

To begin with, a word of warning. In the English text the words ‘Annex I’ are not followed by the comma which appears in all the other language versions. The parties have taken this as a cue for a series of propositions, not surprisingly directly opposed, on the meaning of the provision. This argument seems to me quite futile. The presence or absence of a punctuation mark, the use of which in the various languages is different and largely a matter of taste cannot have the significance which is binc inde attributed to it. I would add that, when the language versions of a Community provision do not agree, the provision must be ‘interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part’ (judgment of 28 March 1985 in Case 100/84 Commission v United Kingdom [1985] ECR 1177, paragraph 17).

It is precisely on this kind of hermeneutic approach that the Commission bases its case. It maintains first of all that Directive 76/756/EEC was intended to achieve a complete harmonization of the rules on lighting and light-signalling on motor vehicles. The prohibition laid down in Article 2 refers accordingly to all the equipment which Community law requires or permits to be installed on motor vehicles. It follows that the Member States may not unilaterally make the approval of motor vehicles subject to the presence thereon, of devices not provided for by the Community legislation. If they could, differences would sooner or later emerge in their legislation and the purpose of the directive would be frustrated.

For its part, the United Kingdom gives a strictly literal interpretation to Article 2. In its view the words ‘these devices’ refer to those listed in Annex I and therefore preclude any possibility of extending the prohibition at issue to devices which are not mentioned in that annex. Furthermore, far from being intended to achieve complete harmonization, the directive was intended to introduce common rules which, although detailed, leave it open to the Member States to prescribe other and perhaps stricter requirements. The non-exhaustive nature of the Community rules is confirmed by the fact that there has existed for some time in the United Kingdom special legislation — never contested by the Community Executive — for lights and light-signalling devices on long vehicles and ambulances.

Let us begin by asking ourselves what are the background to and the aim of the piece of legislation which we are called upon to interpret. After finding that the provisions on the lighting equipment of motor vehicles varied substantially from one country to another, the Commission considered it expedient to require the Member States to supplement or replace their rules with identical requirements ‘in order ... to allow the EEC type-approval procedure which was the subject of Council Directive 70/156/EEC ... to be introduced in respect of each type of vehicle’. The legislation with which we are concerned therefore constitutes the first step in a policy which has its sights set on a far more ambitious objective: the introduction of a single certificate of conformity on the basis of which the vehicles manufactured in a Member State may be approved in every other Member State of the Community without undergoing further checks.

This is still a long way off, but some of the conditions which will make it possible have already been established. This is precisely the case in the field which concerns us. Here, in fact, after the entry into force of Directive 76/756/EEC and at least as regards vehicles intended for export or coming from other Member States, the States must refrain from introducing new technical requirements, whatever their nature or purpose. If they did not, the requirement which a Member State imposes in its own territory of a device not provided for in the directive would prevent the approval (and thus the sale) in that territory of vehicles produced in the other Member States in conformity with the Community rules; and the same obstacles would be encountered by vehicles manufactured in the first-mentioned State when it came to their export to the countries in which that device is not accepted.

The purpose of Article 2 is precisely to prevent difficulties of this kind. That provision is intended to enable all European manufacturers to market their products throughout the Community without having to equip them with special lighting devices for each Member State for which they are intended. This, it seems to me, is enough to rebut the United Kingdom's interpretation of the provision.

Quite unacceptable, in the next place, is the argument, put forward by the United Kingdom at the hearing, to the effect that the various approximation directives will become effective only when there is a ‘complete’ set of rules, that is to say governing every aspect of the putting into service of motor vehicles. That argument ignores the fact that the process of harmonization to which I have alluded is conceived in terms of progression by degrees so as to tackle one sector after another and that the achievement of its final objective — the adoption of a Community certificate of conformity — is dependent on exact compliance with each individual directive.

Lastly, the fact that the Commission never contested the United Kingdom's requirements for the approval of ambulances and long vehicles is of no relevance. It is sufficient to point out in that respect that additional devices for special vehicles are not covered by Directive 76/756/EEC, as is clear from Item 10.3 of Annex I to Directive 70/156/EEC of 6 February 1970 (Official Journal, English Special Edition, 1970 (I), p. 96).

In the light of the foregoing considerations I propose that the Court declare that, by requiring manufacturers to equip vehicles intended to be approved and put into service after 1 April 1987, the United Kingdom has infringed the provisions of Directive 76/756/EEC of 27 July 1976 and has therefore failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty.

I also propose that costs should be awarded on the basis of the principle that they should be borne by the party which fails in its submissions.