The questions relating to the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU
21 By its questions relating to the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, the referring court seeks essentially to determine the scope of its power to choose and reformulate the questions proposed by one of the parties in the main proceedings and any duty it may be under to make such a choice and reformulate the questions.
22 In that context, the Consiglio di Stato asks the Court, in particular, whether that provision precludes the application of national rules which would have the effect of preventing the national court from exercising its power to make a reference or compelling it to reproduce the questions proposed by the parties.
23 Furthermore, in the event that the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as imposing on the national court of final instance an unconditional obligation to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling a question of interpretation of European Union law raised by a party to the main proceedings, the Consiglio di Stato asks the Court whether the requirement that proceedings be concluded within a reasonable time, enshrined in European Union law, has any effect on the duties of a court of final instance under that provision.
24 Moreover, the Consiglio di Stato refers a question concerning the circumstances under which non-compliance with the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU may constitute a clear breach of European Union law as a prerequisite for non-contractual liability on the part of State for infringement of that law.
25 It should be pointed out, first, that in so far as no appeal lies against the decisions of a national court, such a court is, in principle, obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of the TFEU is raised before it (Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior [1997] ECR I-6013, paragraph 26).
26 It follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts or tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of European Union law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, those courts or tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of justice a question concerning the interpretation of European Union law raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case (Case 283/81 Cilfit and Others [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 10).
27 On the other hand, if those courts or tribunals consider that recourse to European Union law is necessary to enable them to decide a case, Article 267 TFEU imposes, in principle, an obligation on them to refer to the Court of Justice any question of interpretation which may arise (see Cilfit and Others, paragraphs 11 to 20).
28 The Court has already held that the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States institutes direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties (Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I-9641, paragraph 90, and Case C-104/10 Kelly [2011] ECR I-6813, paragraph 62).
29 The determination and formulation of the questions to be put to the Court devolves upon the national court alone and the parties to the main proceedings may not change their tenor (Joined Cases C-42/10, C-45/10 and C-57/10 Vlaamse Dierenartsenvereniging and Janssens [2011] ECR I-2975, paragraph 43, and Case C-316/10 Danske Svineproducenter [2011] ECR I-13721, paragraph 32).
30 Although that court is at liberty to request the parties to the dispute before it to suggest wording suitable for the question to be referred, the fact remains that it is for it alone ultimately to decide both its form and content (Kelly, paragraph 65).
31 It follows from the foregoing that it is for the referring court alone to determine and formulate the questions to be referred for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of European Union law which are necessary in order to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings.
32 As regards the national rules of procedure to which the referring court alluded without, however, clarifying their exact scope, it suffices, in any event, to note that such rules cannot affect the powers and obligations conferred on a national court such as the referring court under Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, Cartesio, paragraphs 93, 94 and 98).
33 In addition, it is appropriate to point out that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, including procedural provisions, and it is not necessary for the court to await the prior setting aside of that national provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see, to that effect, Case C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I-8889, paragraph 31).
34 As regards, next, the effect, if any, of the requirement that proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time – a matter raised by the referring court – it should be noted that the Consiglio de Stato has formulated its question in such a way that it is to be put to the Court only in the event that Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as imposing on the national court of final instance an unconditional obligation to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling a question of interpretation of European Union law raised by a party to the main proceedings. In those circumstances, and in the light of paragraphs 25 to 33 above, there is no need to reply to that question.
35 Concerning, finally, the clear breach of European Union law as a prerequisite for non-contractual liability on the part of the State for infringement of that law, that question is manifestly irrelevant and hypothetical in the context of the main proceedings. It is not apparent from the order for reference that such liability is in issue in the main proceedings, or even that that issue was raised by one of the parties to the main proceedings as a procedural issue.
36 In view of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions concerning the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU is that that provision must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the referring court alone to determine and formulate the questions referred for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of European Union law which it considers relevant for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. National rules which have the effect of undermining that jurisdiction must be disapplied.
The questions concerning European Union competition rules
37 Given that, in the present case, the referring court did in fact reformulate the questions proposed by the CNG, it is appropriate to examine the questions as reformulated.
38 In essence, that court seeks to establish whether Article 101 TFEU precludes a professional association, such as the National Association of Geologists in Italy, from adopting rules of professional conduct that lay down as criteria for determining remuneration, in addition to the quality and scale of the work to be performed, the dignity of the profession, with the result that, where fees are set below a certain level – a situation comparable to that in which minimum fees are fixed – that may be penalised on grounds of breach of those rules.
39 Moreover, the Consiglio di Stato asks the Court whether national law may provide for a more stringent safeguard for competition than that afforded by European Union rules. In that regard, it should be noted that the relevance of that question for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings is not apparent from the order for reference. The order for reference does not contain information identifying the relevance of the response to such a question for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. Such an explanation was, however, required as it is apparent from the file before the Court that that dispute concerns the legality of a decision of the Authority, which applied Article 101 TFUE, not the national rules concerning agreements restricting competition. That question must therefore be declared inadmissible.
40 The same applies with regard to the questions relating to the interpretation of Regulation No 2137/85 and Directives 2005/36 and 2006/123.
41 As regards the question referred to in paragraph 38 above, it is appropriate to examine to what extent a professional organisation such as the National Association of Geologists in Italy should be regarded as an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU when adopting rules such as those laid down by the Code of Conduct.
42 In that examination, it is necessary to verify whether, when it adopts rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings, a professional association is to be treated as an association of undertakings or, on the other hand, as a public authority, on the ground that its activity is connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority (Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 57 and case-law cited).
43 As regards the nature of CNG’s activities, it is apparent from Articles 8 and 9 of Law No 112/1963 that all geologists entered in the register established by that provision constitute the Association and elect the CNG, the latter being responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules regulating the profession and all other provisions concerning the profession and for adopting disciplinary measures.
44 It should be noted that, when it adopts a measure such as the Code of Conduct, a professional organisation such as the National Association of Geologists is neither fulfilling a social function based on the principle of solidarity, nor exercising powers which are typically those of a public authority. It acts as the regulatory body of a profession, the practice of which constitutes an economic activity (see, to that effect, Wouters and Others, paragraph 58).
45 In the light of those considerations, the Court finds therefore that a professional organisation such as the National Association of Geologists acts as an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU when drawing up rules of professional conduct such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
46 As regards the question whether the rules of professional conduct at issue in the main proceedings constitute a decision under Article 101 TFEU, it should be recalled that even a price recommendation, whatever its exact legal status, may be regarded as constituting such a decision (Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission [1987] ECR 405, paragraph 32).
47 In the present case, the fact that the Code of Conduct is binding on geologists and that it is possible to impose penalties on them in the event of non-compliance with that code must lead to the conclusion that the rules laid down therein constitute a decision under Article 101 TFEU.
48 In order for European Union competition rules to apply to an arrangement or abusive practice it is necessary for it to be capable of affecting trade between Member States (Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619, paragraph 40).
49 For that purpose, an agreement, decision or practice must make it possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability, on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact, that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way as to cause concern that it might hinder the attainment of a single market between Member States (Manfredi and Others, paragraph 42).
50 An agreement, decision or concerted practice extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about (Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 48, and Manfredi and Others, paragraph 45).
51 That may be the effect of the decision of the association of undertakings in question in the main proceedings, since Italian law provides that geologists, throughout the territory of the Italian Republic, must be members of the professional association, which means that they are subject to rules of professional conduct and liable to disciplinary action for breach of those rules.
52 In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that rules of professional conduct which lay down as criteria for determining professional remuneration the dignity of the profession as well as the quality and scale of the work to be performed are liable to restrict competition within the internal market.
53 However, not every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which a decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, which in the present case consist in ensuring that the ultimate consumers of the services in question are provided with the necessary guarantees. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97).
54 In that context, it is important to verify whether the restrictions thus imposed by the rules at issue in the main proceedings are limited to what is necessary to ensure the implementation of legitimate objectives (see, to that effect, Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, paragraph 47).
55 On the basis of the file submitted to it, the Court is not able to assess whether the existence of the criterion relating to the dignity of the profession may be considered necessary for the implementation of a legitimate objective, such as that connected to the guarantees provided to the final consumers of the services of geologists, since, inter alia, that criterion is but one of a number of criteria for determining remuneration that are closely linked to the quality of geologists’ work, such as the scale and difficulty of the task to be performed, technical knowledge and the commitment required.
56 It is for the referring court to assess, in the light of the overall context in which the Code of Conduct produces its effects, including the national legal framework in its entirety and the manner in which that code is applied in practice by the National Association of Geologists, whether there is a restrictive effect on competition within the internal market. That court must also verify whether, in the light of all the relevant material before it, the rules of that code, in particular in so far as they apply the criterion based on the dignity of the profession, may be regarded as necessary for the implementation of the legitimate objective of providing guarantees to consumers.
57 In view of all the above considerations, the answer to the questions concerning European Union competition rules is that rules such as those laid down by the Code of Conduct that establish as criteria for determining the remuneration of geologists, in addition to the quality and scale of the work to be performed, the dignity of the profession, constitute a decision by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU which may have the effect of restricting competition within the internal market. It is for the referring court to assess, in the light of the overall context in which the Code of Conduct produces its effects, including the national legal framework in its entirety and the manner in which that code is applied in practice by the National Association of Geologists, whether that effect is produced in the present case. That court must also verify whether, in the light of all the relevant material before it, the rules of that code, in particular in so far as they apply the criterion based on the dignity of the profession, may be regarded as necessary for the implementation of the legitimate objective of providing guarantees to consumers of geologists’ services.