Findings of the Court
51
As regards, in the first place, the Commission’s arguments referred to in paragraph 45 above based on its claim that the decisions at issue do not have binding legal effects, it is settled case-law that any provision or measure adopted by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever form they might take, the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, a natural or legal person by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment (judgments of
11 November 1981,
IBM v Commission
, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9
; of
12 September 2006,
Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission
, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54
; and of
13 October 2011,
Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission
, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 37
).
52
In the present case, as regards the decision of 16 December 2014, the General Court first of all noted, in paragraphs 37 to 42 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑29/15, which are not disputed by the Commission, that that decision was a financing decision adopted by that institution on the basis of Article 84 of Regulation No 966/2012 and that not only the legal effect but also the purpose of that decision was to amend the initial decision by designating GIZ, instead of IMG, as the entity entrusted with implementing the trade development action provided for in the 2013 action programme for Myanmar/Burma.
53
In carrying out that analysis, the General Court noted, inter alia, in paragraph 38 of that judgment, that it was common ground between the parties that the initial decision designated IMG as the entity entrusted ‘subject to the conclusion of a delegation agreement’.
54
Taking those various factors into account, the General Court went on to find, in paragraphs 44 to 48 and 57 to 63 of that judgment, that the decision of 16 December 2014 produced a binding legal effect capable of affecting IMG’s interests by depriving it of any possibility of concluding such a delegation agreement.
55
In that regard, it should be noted that Article 84(2) of Regulation No 966/2012, on the basis of which both the initial decision and the decision of 16 December 2014 were adopted, provides that the commitment of expenditure must be preceded by such decisions. As for that commitment, it is, as is apparent from Article 85(1) and Article 86(1) of that regulation, the operation by which the authorising officer first makes a budgetary expenditure commitment before entering into a legal commitment with the third party who will receive the payments implementing that expenditure. Consequently, the Commission is correct in claiming that no legal commitment had been entered into with IMG when the decision of 16 December 2014 was adopted and, therefore, IMG did not have any right to have a delegation agreement concluded with it.
56
Nevertheless, as stated by the General Court in paragraphs 42 and 59 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑29/15, the fact remains that a decision to commit expenditure, in accordance with Article 84(3) of Regulation No 966/2012, must ‘specify the entity or person entrusted ..., the criteria used to select the entity or person and the tasks entrusted to that entity or person’. The initial decision had thus selected IMG as the entity entrusted with one of the actions stipulated in the 2013 action programme for Myanmar/Burma.
57
In addition, it follows from Article 53d(2) of Regulation No 1605/2002, which was applicable when the initial decision was adopted, that the purpose of a delegation agreement, such as that referred to in that decision, is to set out detailed arrangements for the implementation of the budgetary tasks previously entrusted in a given case to an international organisation. The conclusion of that agreement must therefore necessarily be preceded by the adoption of a financing decision entrusting that organisation with such tasks and can be concluded with that organisation alone. By the same token, if an entity entrusted with the tasks in question loses that status, the automatic consequence is the loss of the possibility of concluding the corresponding delegation agreement. As it is, the specific purpose and legal effect of the decision of 16 December 2014 was to designate GIZ as the entity entrusted in order to enable the Commission to conclude a delegation agreement with that entity instead of with IMG.
58
In those circumstances, the General Court was fully entitled to hold, in paragraphs 44, 45, 57, 59, 60 and 62 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑29/15, that the decision of 16 December 2014 led to IMG losing both its legal status as the selected entity entrusted with a budgetary task and any genuine possibility of concluding the corresponding delegation agreement.
59
The loss of such legal status clearly constitutes a binding legal effect capable of affecting IMG’s interests. As for the loss of any genuine possibility of concluding the corresponding delegation agreement, it is the automatic consequence of the loss of that legal status, as stated in paragraph 57 above, and therefore also constitutes a binding legal effect on that basis.
60
Therefore, the ground raised by the Commission in support of its cross-appeal in Case C‑183/17 P, in so far as it alleges that the decision of 16 December 2014 had no binding legal effect, must be rejected as unfounded.
61
As far as concerns the decision of 8 May 2015, it should be noted at the outset that it does not express a future intention, even though the Commission claims that such is the case, but an existing, current decision not to conclude any delegation agreement ‘until there is absolute certainty with regard to IMG’s legal status as an international organisation’. In that respect, it deprives the party concerned of any real chance of being entrusted with new budget implementation tasks and granted the corresponding funding in connection with the indirect management of the EU budget, as stated by the General Court in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑381/15.
62
The Court has previously held that, when the effect of a decision adopted by the Commission when exercising its own powers against a specific person is, simply because that act was adopted, to cause that person to lose any chance of actually receiving EU funding, that effect should be regarded as a legally binding effect of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of
22 April 1997,
Geotronics v Commission
, C‑395/95 P, EU:C:1997:210, paragraphs 14 and 15
).
63
Therefore, in so far as it alleges that the decision of 8 May 2015 had no binding legal effect, the ground raised by the Commission in support of its cross-appeal in Case C‑184/17 P must also be rejected as unfounded.
64
As regards, in the second place, the Commission’s reasoning set out in paragraph 46 above, according to which a financing decision, such as that in question in the present cases, should have been regarded as an act which does not produce any binding legal effect vis-à-vis third parties, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that measures that are only intended to produce legal effects within the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted the measure may not, in principle, be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of
25 February 1988,
Les Verts v Parliament
, 190/84, EU:C:1988:94, paragraph 8
, and of
6 April 2000,
Spain v Commission
, C‑443/97, EU:C:2000:190, paragraph 28
).
65
In the present case, it is, however, sufficient to note that, since the General Court was fully entitled to consider that the decision of 16 December 2014 was intended to produce binding legal effects vis-à-vis IMG, on the grounds set out in paragraphs 57 to 59 above, it cannot be claimed that that court erred in law by rejecting as unfounded, in paragraphs 49 to 52 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑29/15, the Commission’s argument that that decision produced effects only within the Commission.
66
In the third and final place, the Commission submits, as stated in paragraph 47 above, that the decision of 16 December 2014 should have been classified as ‘a measure which merely confirms an earlier measure’, that is, the letter of 25 April 2014 informing IMG that the precautionary measures of 26 February 2014 had been adopted.
67
In that regard, a measure is to be regarded as merely confirming an earlier measure when it contains no new factual or legal elements as compared with the earlier measure (see, to that effect, judgments of
14 April 1970,
Nebe v Commission
, 24/69, EU:C:1970:22, paragraph 8
, and of
3 April 2014,
Commission v Netherlands and ING Groep
, C‑224/12 P, EU:C:2014:213, paragraph 69
).
68
In the present case, the General Court considered, in paragraphs 70 to 73 of the judgment under appeal in Case T‑29/15, that, although the examination of the content of the precautionary measures of 26 February 2014 showed that their effect was to temporarily suspend the conclusion with IMG of any delegation agreement such as that referred to in the initial decision, it was apparent from the analysis of the decision of 16 December 2014 that the binding legal effect of its content was to deprive IMG, specifically and definitively, of the possibility of concluding such an agreement.
69
In so doing, the General Court highlighted the new factual and legal elements specific to the decision of 16 December 2014, as compared with the precautionary measures of 26 February 2014.
70
Therefore, in so far as it alleges that the decision of 16 December 2014 was ‘a measure which merely confirms an earlier measure’, the ground raised by the Commission in support of its cross-appeal in Case C‑183/17 P must be rejected as unfounded.
71
Since none of the grounds raised by the Commission in support of its cross-appeals have been successful, those appeals must be dismissed in their entirety.
72
Moreover, there is no need to adjudicate on the Commission’s request that the OLAF report be removed from the case file, as that request has become devoid of purpose, as the Commission informed the Court at the hearing that it had disclosed the report to IMG on its own initiative.