1. Violent passenger behaviour as a risk to aviation safety
29.
By its first question, the referring court asks whether acts of physical assault, such as those described above, committed by a passenger against other passengers and cabin crew members during a flight may be considered as ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
30.
The wording itself of Regulation No 261/2004 contains no legal definition of that concept. However, some guidance is provided in the second sentence of recital 14 of that regulation. Accordingly, such circumstances may arise, inter alia, in the event of ‘security risks’.(13) The question nevertheless arises as to what security risks may constitute extraordinary circumstances in the specific field of air passenger transport.
31.
In my opinion, examination of that question calls for an interpretation which takes account of the legal framework applicable to the field in question.(14) Regulation No 261/2004 cannot be interpreted without taking into account the political, socio-economic and technological context in which it was adopted, as well as subsequent relevant regulatory developments.(15) That approach, which supplements other methods of interpretation recognised by the case-law of the Court,(16) will enable me to identify the risks connected with air passenger transport currently recognised by the EU legislature. It will also enable the Court to interpret Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 consistently with other relevant measures, thus helping to ensure the unity of the EU legal order.
32.
It is apparent from an analysis of all the relevant legal measures governing air passenger transport that the EU legislature attaches particular importance to safety, since Regulation No 261/2004 itself provides, in Article 2(j), that passengers may be denied boarding for ‘reasons of … safety or security’. I note that the wording of that provision does not preclude the risk to which it refers from being attributable to the violent behaviour of a passenger.
33.
Mention should also be made of Regulation No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation and the related legal measures. Implementing Regulation 2015/1018 lays down a list classifying occurrences which may represent a significant risk to aviation safety and which are to be mandatorily reported by aviation professionals according to Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. Point 6(2) of Annex I to Implementing Regulation 2015/1018 mentions ‘difficulty in controlling intoxicated, violent or unruly passengers’ as an occurrence related to security during the operation of the aircraft. The EU legislation therefore expressly considers that the violent behaviour of a passenger towards other aircraft occupants, such as that which has been found in the main proceedings, constitutes a significant risk which must be reported to the competent authorities.
34.
Regulation 2018/1139 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency is also relevant in this context, as it confers a central role on the pilot in command by giving him or her, under point 1.3 of Annex V to that regulation, responsibility for the ‘safety of the aircraft and for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board’. The provision in point 3(g) of Annex V seems to me to be of particular relevance, given that it states that ‘a pilot in command must take all necessary measures so as to minimise the consequences on the flight of disruptive passenger behaviour’. Point 7.3 of that annex states that, ‘in an emergency situation, which endangers the operation or the safety of the aircraft and/or persons on board’, the pilot in command must take any action he/she considers necessary in the interest of safety. I note that that provision is drafted in sufficiently broad terms to be able to classify the physical assault by one passenger against other persons on board a flight, in a case such as the present one, as a risk to aviation safety.
35.
In international law, mention should be made of the Tokyo Convention, to which all the Member States, but not the European Union, are contracting parties. Although – unlike other instruments of international law governing matters relating to air transport –(17) that convention is not part of the EU legal order, in so far as there has been no explicit transposition of the convention which would reflect a potential transfer of powers from the Member States to the European Union,(18) the fact remains that certain legislative parallels reveal a common legal conviction. Therefore, it seems to me that the Tokyo Convention may be used as a reference instrument for the purposes of interpreting EU law. According to Article 1(1) of the Tokyo Convention, it applies to ‘offences against penal law’ and to ‘acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardise the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardise good order and discipline on board’. Like the abovementioned provisions of Regulation 2018/1139, Article 6(1) of that convention allows the pilot in command of the aircraft to take reasonable measures, including restraint, which are necessary to ‘protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein’ when he or she has reasonable grounds to believe ‘that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1’.(19) The criteria for applying the Tokyo Convention as a reference instrument for the purposes of interpretation seem to me to have been fulfilled in the present case, given that, with some exceptions, physical assault constitutes a punishable act according to the criminal laws of the EU Member States.
36.
It is apparent from the foregoing that, in so far as EU legislation and international law consider violent passenger behaviour towards other passengers and members of cabin crew, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to be a significant risk to aviation safety, it cannot automatically be ruled out that the situation described constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2014.
2. Analysis of the extraordinary nature of the circumstance in terms of the criteria laid down by case-law
37.
As the Court has already stated in its case-law, ‘security risks’ – like the other circumstances referred to in recital 14 of Regulation No 261/2004 – are not all capable of constituting ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which are grounds for the air carrier’s exemption from liability.(20) It should be borne in mind that, to the extent that it leads to a derogation from the normal rule, namely the payment of compensation, which serves a consumer protection objective, the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ referred to in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted strictly.(21)
38.
According to settled case-law, in order for a situation to be covered by that concept, two cumulative conditions must be fulfilled, namely (a) that the events are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and (b) that the events are beyond the air carrier’s actual control.(22) Assessment on a case-by-case basis is required in order to ascertain whether those criteria have indeed been fulfilled. It is therefore necessary to conduct a rigorous examination of those criteria, taking into account the factual background set out in the order for reference.
(a) Whether the event is inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity
39.
It is apparent from an examination of the relevant cases that the first criterion requires that the event in question is not intrinsically, inseparably and typically connected with air passenger transport. In other words, the concept concerned covers events which do not normally take place in the context of the organisation and/or operation of air transport. It therefore covers all events which are not linked to actual air transport operations but which, as specific external circumstances, adversely affect, or even render impossible, the planned execution of those operations.
40.
As a preliminary point, it should be recalled – as obvious as it may seem – that the function of civil air traffic services is to enable the transport of passengers and goods over long distances. The transport of passengers and goods is an important economic activity, carried out primarily by private undertakings, and therefore contributes to the economy of the European Union. By making it easier for European citizens to fly, passenger transport has brought them closer together and enabled them to be better connected to the rest of the world. The abundance of air travel opportunities has enabled many European citizens to travel, study and work in Europe and beyond. Moreover, the number and frequency of flights have grown substantially thanks to the creation of the internal market for aviation, an increasingly competitive environment which has made flying cheaper.(23)
41.
From that point of view, it also seems clear to me that neither the education of, nor the imposition of penalties on, passengers who demonstrate violent behaviour can reasonably be regarded as being part of the functions of civil air traffic services. Although it is true that cabin crew give safety information to passengers before every flight, it is also true that the purpose of that practice is only to ensure the smooth running of the transport operation. Safety instructions are designed to help passengers familiarise themselves with the risks inherent in air transport, namely the risk of injury during take-off or landing, or in the event of turbulence or a drop in cabin pressure, etc.(24)
42.
Those safety instructions do not, however, cover the more general issue of the use of violence in interpersonal relationships, and rightly so, given that that issue goes beyond the context of transport, as I shall explain below. For their part, passengers are required to follow the crew’s instructions. The competence of the cabin crew with regard to the operation of the aircraft and its authority to maintain good order and discipline on board are very rarely called into question by anyone.
43.
As argued by a number of interveners in the present case, the violent behaviour of some passengers towards other passengers and towards cabin crew is not an event that is typical of an air carrier’s operations. Unfortunately for all those involved, a physical assault can occur in any other situation and for a variety of reasons. Some of those reasons may be closely related to the personality of the attacker, while others, such as stress, may be caused by the specific situation in which the attacker finds himself or herself during a flight.(25)
44.
That being said, it must be stated that the order for reference does not contain any details as to the cause of the aggressive behaviour of the passenger in question. For that reason, and since it is impossible to list all the situations which may give rise to the violent behaviour of a passenger on board an aircraft, the Court will have to confine itself to general considerations in its answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling.
45.
For the sake of completeness, I would like to emphasise that the fact that isolated cases of physical assault occur sporadically does not seem to me to be sufficient reason in itself to conclude that the use of violence is inherent in the normal exercise of air passenger transport. In that regard, I share the reservations expressed by Advocate General Tanchev in his Opinion in Case C‑501/17, Germanwings,(26) concerning the argument that the frequency of an event should constitute a limiting or differentiating criterion. I would stress that, leaving aside the questionable validity of that argument, there is nothing to support it in the present case, since all the interveners conclude that the use of violence on board an aircraft is a relatively rare event, or in any case, that it is no more frequent on board an aircraft than anywhere else.(27)
46.
In so far as the use of violence by a passenger against other passengers and/or cabin crew is not what would be considered to be socially acceptable behaviour, and is even punishable under the criminal law of the Member States, it is clearly an event which is outside the realm of air transport. It does not take place in the normal course of the organisation and/or operation of air transport. It may also adversely affect the organisation and/or operation of air transport if that violence is directed against the aircraft’s structure and the staff responsible for its operation. National legislation generally takes that into account by classifying such an act of aggression as an aggravated offence.
47.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the event at issue is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned.
(b) Control over the event
48.
The second criterion requires that the event in question be beyond the actual control of the air carrier. As set out above,(28) there may be a number of reasons for an individual’s aggressive behaviour, which makes it almost impossible to anticipate and to respond to it appropriately. Given the unpredictability of violent passenger behaviour and taking into account that that behaviour, as described in the order for reference, is not inherent in air transport, it seems to me to be inappropriate for the air carrier to be given sole responsibility for preventing and suppressing violent incidents on board an aircraft. To the extent that, first, compliance with the rules of civility is required in all everyday situations and, second, cabin crew constitute the principal contact point for the amicable resolution of any dispute between passengers, I consider that each passenger should take responsibility for his or her behaviour and for the consequences which flow therefrom.
49.
I am persuaded by the argument put forward by several of the Member States which submitted observations in this case – in particular the German and Polish Governments – according to which cabin crew members have only very limited means of controlling an aggressive passenger. Indeed, although the pilot in command and cabin crew members may give specific orders to a passenger (for example, urge him or her to calm down, give him or her a warning, allocate a different seat, and so forth) or restrain a passenger in order to ensure the safety of the flight, they cannot control him or her in such a way as to completely exclude any disruptions of the flight by that passenger, since those, as indicated above, are the responsibility of that passenger.
50.
That consideration applies all the more to the prevention of such violent incidents, since, generally, air carriers do not have any information indicating that a passenger will, on board the aircraft, engage in aggressive behaviour which may compromise the safety of a flight. Furthermore, air carriers do not have the right to deny boarding to a passenger who is behaving normally at the time of boarding. However, it must not be forgotten that, where a violent incident occurs after the aircraft has taken off, cabin crew members can no longer adopt preventive measures and the scope of their actions is therefore limited to taking the measures to suppress the incident identified above, within the confined space of an aircraft cabin.
51.
I share the view of the Austrian Government and the Commission that the situation should be assessed in a fundamentally different way if a passenger exhibited behavioural issues before, or even during, boarding, and the air carrier may therefore have had knowledge of those issues. In such a case, it does not seem to me to be justified to exempt the air carrier from liability, allowing it legitimately to rely on extraordinary circumstances if the passenger concerned later proceeded to behave inappropriately or continued to behave in that way.(29) The interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of EU law and of the Tokyo Convention, which give the pilot in command the power to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the flight,(30) must necessarily incorporate the idea of risk prevention, in so far as that is possible, in order for those provisions to be effective.
52.
In view of the limits which are usually imposed on cabin crew members in terms of the measures they can take to prevent and suppress such risks, disembarking a violent passenger at the nearest accessible airport – as a measure of last resort – does not appear to be an unreasonable option if the pilot in command decides, after careful consideration and taking into account all the circumstances of the case, that continuing the flight in such conditions is impossible without compromising the safety of the aircraft or of the persons on board. Moreover, I would point out that that is precisely what the provisions of Article 6(1)(c) and Article 8(1) of the Tokyo Convention authorise the pilot in command to do when faced with such a situation.(31)
53.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that if, by adopting the measures which they are authorised to take, cabin crew members are unable to calm a passenger, and that passenger compromises the safety of the flight – for example, by threatening the physical safety of the persons on board the aircraft or by harming them – that situation constitutes a circumstance beyond the control of the air carrier for the purposes of the second criterion laid down by the case-law. That is certainly the case in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, where a disruptive passenger bites other passengers and assaults the cabin crew members who were attempting to calm him.
54.
My examination of the facts leads me to conclude that those two criteria, laid down in the case-law for the purpose of establishing the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) as interpreted in the light of recitals 14 and 15 of Regulation No 261/2004, have been fulfilled in the present case.