Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 3 July 2025

– Arguments of the parties

38 By the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, that an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter cannot, in principle, be validly relied on in a dispute which is contractual in nature and is covered by Article 272 TFEU, on the ground that the latter can rely only on infringements of contractual provisions or of the law applicable to the contract where, as in the present case, the General Court is not simultaneously seised, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, of an action for annulment against an enforceable Commission decision formally establishing a contractual claim. In that respect, the General Court was wrong to rely on the judgment of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission (C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 88 ), which is cited to apply by analogy. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the General Court also wrongly held, in paragraph 34 of the judgment under appeal, that, despite the use of terminology characteristic of actions brought pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the action had to be regarded as being based on Article 272 TFEU and as raising a contractual dispute.

39 The appellant considers that such an assessment infringes the right to effective judicial protection, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, and submits that, in its judgment of 16 July 2020, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission (C‑378/16 P, EU:C:2020:575, paragraph 81 ), the Court of Justice stated that, if the parties decide, in their contract, to confer on the EU judicature, by means of an arbitration clause, jurisdiction over disputes relating to that contract, that judicature will have jurisdiction, independently of the applicable law stipulated in that contract, to examine any infringement of the Charter or of the general principles of EU law.

40 The REA submits, as a preliminary point, that paragraphs 34 and 53 of the judgment under appeal do not infringe the right to effective judicial protection, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, in so far as, first, paragraph 53 of that judgment sets out the reasons why the General Court considers that an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter cannot, in principle, be validly relied on in the context of an action based on Article 272 TFEU and, second, paragraph 34 of that judgment provides clarification as to the scope of the appellant’s head of claim at first instance. That ground of appeal should therefore be rejected as ineffective.

41 In the alternative, the REA submits that that part of the ground of appeal is unfounded in so far as, first, paragraph 34 of the judgment under appeal sets out the General Court’s preliminary observations with a view to finding that the appellant’s action, based on Article 272 TFEU and not on Article 263 TFEU, is admissible and, second, the appellant’s challenges referred to in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal are unsupported by any argument.

– Findings of the Court

42 It should be noted that the principle of good administration entails the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (judgments of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia , C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 95 , and of 8 October 2020, Union des industries de la protection des plantes , C‑514/19, EU:C:2020:803, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

43 Where the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union act in the performance of a contract whose clauses they have stipulated, that situation falls within the scope of EU law and therefore within the scope of the Charter, within the meaning of Article 51 thereof.

44 Thus, as the Court has already held, when the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union perform a contract, they remain subject to their obligations under the Charter and the general principles of EU law. Consequently, the fact that the law applicable to the contract concerned does not guarantee the same rights as those guaranteed by the Charter and the general principles of EU law does not exempt the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union from ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the latter are respected in relation to their contracting parties (judgments of 16 July 2020, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission , C‑378/16 P, EU:C:2020:575, paragraph 82 , and of 16 July 2020, ADR Center v Commission , C‑584/17 P, EU:C:2020:576, paragraph 86 ).

45 Furthermore, if the parties decide, in their contract, to confer on the EU judicature, by means of an arbitration clause, jurisdiction over disputes relating to that contract, that judicature will have jurisdiction, independently of the applicable law stipulated in that contract, to examine any infringement of the Charter or of the general principles of EU law (judgment of 16 July 2020, Inclusion Alliance for Europe v Commission , C‑378/16 P, EU:C:2020:575, paragraph 81 ).

46 That case-law has been confirmed more recently, and prior to the delivery of the judgment under appeal, in a context analogous to that of the present case, namely in the context of an appeal against a judgment of the General Court ruling on an action based on Article 272 TFEU, in which the appellant submitted, inter alia, that the Commission had infringed the principle of good administration within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter (judgments of 14 July 2022, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission , C‑371/21 P, EU:C:2022:566, paragraph 79 , and of 29 September 2022, HIM v Commission , C‑500/21 P, EU:C:2022:741, paragraph 41 ).

47 In those circumstances, it must be held that the General Court erred in law by excluding, in paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, the possibility for the EU judicature to determine whether there had been an infringement of the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter in a dispute which, as in the present case, is covered by Article 272 TFEU.

48 However, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law of the Court of Justice, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement cannot lead to the setting aside of that judgment, and a substitution of grounds must be made and the appeal dismissed (judgment of 19 September 2024, Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament , C‑725/20 P, EU:C:2024:766, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

49 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the rejection of the complaint alleging a breach of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter is shown to be well founded on legal grounds other than those vitiated by the error identified in paragraph 47 of the present judgment.

50 In that regard, first, in accordance with Article 183(1) of the Financial Regulation 2018, the authorising officer responsible is to check, inter alia, at the latest before the payment of the balance, the fulfilment of the conditions triggering the payment of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates, including, where required, the achievement of outputs and/or results. That provision states that the fulfilment of those conditions may be subject to ex post checks and thus expressly recognises the right of the authorising officer responsible to check that the conditions triggering payment have been fulfilled and to reduce the grant where those conditions are not fulfilled or in the event of irregularity, fraud or a breach of other obligations. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with the provisions of the grant agreement concluded between the parties, and in particular Article II.21(1) thereof, at any time during the implementation of the project and up to five years after the end of the project, the REA or the Commission may carry out financial audits relating to the proper implementation of the grant agreement.

51 Second, Article II.21(3) of that agreement lays down the obligation for the beneficiary of the funding to retain, up until five years after the end of the project, the originals or, in exceptional cases, certified copies of the originals, including electronic copies, of all documents relating to the grant agreement.

52 It is apparent from the General Court’s findings in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the judgment under appeal that the SANAD project was completed on 31 December 2016 and that the REA informed the appellant on 21 August 2019 that an audit procedure had been initiated, after sending an email on 8 October 2018, by which it had already raised, in the context of the final payment of the EU contribution to the SANAD project and therefore before payment of the balance, the existence of a number of discrepancies and gaps in the supporting documents produced by the appellant.

53 In addition, in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted that the grant agreement stipulated that the financial audits could be carried out by staff of the REA or of the Commission, and found that, although the appellant relied on a lack of impartiality on the part of those staff, it did not produce the slightest evidence in that regard.

54 In those circumstances, it must be held that the audit in question was not carried out belatedly nor in a manner contrary to the principle of impartiality.

55 It is thus apparent that, notwithstanding the error of law identified in paragraph 47 of the present judgment, Glonatech’s argument alleging a breach of the right to good administration, provided for in Article 41 of the Charter, was unfounded and could therefore be rejected by the General Court.

56 It follows from the foregoing that, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 48 of the present judgment, the first part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

– Arguments of the parties

57 By the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, by excluding the application, in the present case, of the principle of good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, the General Court erred in law in that it disregarded the asymmetry between the parties to the grant agreement. In that context, the question arises as to whether the Commission may simultaneously be both judge and party, thus combining two prerogatives of a public authority. In that regard, the appellant submits that Article 41 of the Charter precludes the use of prerogatives emanating from public authority in exercising rights deriving from contractual relationships where by principle the parties should stand on the same footing.

58 The appellant submits that, by disregarding that aspect, the General Court infringed the fundamental principle enshrined in Article 1161 of the Belgian Civil Code, namely the need for an overall approach to the interpretation of a contract, in that it did not take into consideration, in the present case, the effect of the flat-rate financing. Similarly, the Court failed to have regard to Article 1162 of the Belgian Civil Code, according to which, in cases of doubt, the agreement is to be interpreted against the person that imposed the obligation and in favour of the party that undertook the obligation.

59 The REA contends that the second part of the first ground of appeal is unfounded.

– Findings of the Court

60 It should be recalled that, in accordance with the requirements under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested paragraphs of the judgment which the person bringing the appeal seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal concerned may be inadmissible (judgment of 16 January 2025, Região Autónoma da Madeira v Commission (Madeira Free Zone) , C‑547/23 P, EU:C:2025:22, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

61 Furthermore, it follows from those provisions that an appeal is inadmissible in so far as it merely repeats the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by it. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake on appeal (judgment of 10 November 2016, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission , C‑449/14 P, EU:C:2016:848, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

62 In the present case, it must be noted, in the first place, that, as the REA submits, the appellant’s line of argument is not directed against findings in the judgment under appeal, but, as is apparent in particular from the reference made by the appellant in its appeal to its application before the General Court, instead concerns the dispute between the parties to the grant agreement, which has already been the subject of the proceedings at first instance.

63 In the second place, it should be noted that the references made by the appellant to Articles 1161 and 1162 of the Belgian Civil Code do not refer to paragraphs 34 and 53 of the judgment under appeal or to any other identified part of the judgment under appeal. Thus, the appellant merely refers to disagreements between the parties to the grant agreement and challenges, in essence, the judgment for not having upheld the pleas in law and arguments which it put forward in the proceedings at first instance, without identifying an error of law or an incorrect characterisation of the facts by the General Court that could specifically have involved an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter.

64 In those circumstances, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the present judgment, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

65 Accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

– Arguments of the parties

93 The first part of the fourth ground of appeal is directed against paragraphs 48 and 62 of the judgment under appeal.

94 The appellant submits that, by affirming, in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘according to a fundamental principle of EU financial aid, the European Union can subsidise only expenses which have actually been incurred’, the General Court disregarded the distinctions laid down in Article 125(1) and Articles 181 and 182 of the Financial Regulation 2018, relating to the conditions for triggering payments according to the forms of financing concerned, which led the Court to disregard the specific features of flat-rate financing.

95 In addition, the appellant submits that the General Court erred, in paragraph 48 of the judgment under appeal, in rejecting its argument alleging, in essence, that ‘all the expenses assumed on a flat rate basis are justified because it has properly completed the SANAD project’, or even that the completion of that project would have been impossible if the secondments had never, or only very partially, taken place. According to the appellant, in the context of that project, and in view of the fact that the mere occurrence of secondments of researchers constitutes a condition for triggering the payment of the costs linked to the flat-rate financing, the achievement of the expected results is already evidence which, in itself, makes it possible to establish that those secondments did in fact take place. The present case concerns a project to be carried out solely through ‘knowledge-sharing and inter-sector mobility activities’. In other words, if those secondments had not taken place, no results whatsoever would have been obtained.

96 The REA contends that the present part of this ground of appeal is inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

– Findings of the Court

97 It must be observed that the General Court was fully entitled to find, in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that the fact that it had been possible to successfully complete the SANAD project does not call into question a financial audit being carried out or the conditions under which that audit was conducted by the REA. As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 50 of that judgment, the fact that, technically and in compliance with the requirements of the grant agreement, the project concerned has been properly carried out does not suffice for the appellant to be entitled to the financial aid provided for. It is also necessary for the appellant to have properly carried out its obligations under that agreement so as to enable the REA, in accordance with Article II.21 of the general conditions of that agreement, to verify, notably during a financial audit, that the costs declared are eligible costs and substantiated by evidence. To that end, it is important in particular that the beneficiary is able to prove that the costs declared were actually incurred in order to carry out the project in question.

98 Consequently, as the General Court correctly found in paragraph 51 of that judgment, in the event of a breach of the financial obligations laid down in the grant agreement, the beneficiary of the financial aid loses the right to payment of the grants and, hence, pursuant to Article II.21(6) of the general conditions of that agreement, the co-contractor of the appellant is required to take all appropriate measures in that regard, including the complete or partial recovery of the grant, irrespective of whether the SANAD project has technically been properly carried out.

99 It follows that the beneficiary of the grant therefore acquires a definitive right to payment of the EU financial contribution only if all the conditions to which the award of the grant is subject are satisfied. It is not sufficient for the beneficiary of the grant to show that a project has been carried out to justify the award of a particular grant, since it is incumbent on the beneficiary to prove that the costs declared have been incurred in accordance with the conditions laid down in particular in the grant agreement for the award of the grants concerned.

100 In those circumstances, the first part of the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

– Arguments of the parties

101 By the second part of the fourth ground of appeal, which is directed against paragraphs 55 and 61 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits, first, that the General Court erred in holding, in paragraph 55 of that judgment, that the monitoring system known as the ‘Reporting and Participants Portal’, contrived by the REA and operated under its own responsibility in order to meet basic operational needs, was lacking in both reliability and sufficient probative value. In that context, the appellant submits that the General Court’s rejection of there being a duty on the REA to accept its own monitoring system as sufficient parallel evidence in respect of secondments is abusive and infringes Article 1162 of the Belgian Civil Code.

102 Second, the appellant submits that neither the General Court nor the REA has provided reasons why even a supposed failure by the beneficiary to register, in that monitoring system, the performance at its premises of a secondee from the home organisation could cast doubt on the fact that that secondee was actually present. The Court merely stated, in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal, that the records in the monitoring system provided for in the present case were ‘drawn up on the basis of the mere certified statements of the participants in the SANAD project’, without further clarification. According to the appellant, the evidence was thus distorted in such a way as to cast suspicions over all the beneficiaries as having acted in collusion, which was never the case and is, in any event, contrary to the findings of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

103 By the third part of the fourth ground of appeal, which is directed against paragraphs 82 to 86 and 103 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that, by its email of 8 October 2018, the REA amended the terms of the grant agreement and that it gave rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the appellant that the travel expenses of researchers, as they are subject to a flat-rate contribution, would not be subject to verification of their reality. It follows that the appellant could not expect that, by the letter of 21 August 2019, the REA would initiate a financial audit of the grant agreement. Accordingly, the beneficiaries of the project, including the appellant, relied decisively on the REA’s email of 8 October 2018 before finding themselves, following the letter of 21 August 2019, unexpectedly confronted with a long list of information to be provided when the audit had already commenced.

104 In that regard, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in finding, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘it is not possible to find that the wording of the REA’s [email] of 8 October 2018 contradicts that which appears, inter alia, in the REA’s subsequent letter of 21 August 2019’ and that ‘it is by no means excluded that the documents required must make it possible to verify the actual dates of the secondments’.

105 In addition, according to the appellant, the email of 8 October 2018 had the effect of comforting the appellant in its practice of possibly failing to retain travel documents relating to secondments.

106 The REA contends that the second and third parts of the fourth ground of appeal are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

– Findings of the Court

107 It must be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence accepted. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence therefore do not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgments of 29 October 2015, Commission v ANKO , C‑78/14 P, EU:C:2015:732, paragraph 22 , and of 14 January 2021, ERCEA v Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis , C‑280/19 P, EU:C:2021:23, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

108 Furthermore, where an appellant alleges distortion of elements of fact or of evidence by the General Court, that person must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, according to the appellant, led to that distortion. In addition, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 6 June 2024, Ryanair v Commission , C‑441/21 P, EU:C:2024:477, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

109 In addition, it must be recalled that, in the context of an appeal, the appraisal by the General Court of the probative value of the documents before it cannot, save where the rules on the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have not been observed or the evidence has been distorted, be challenged before the Court of Justice (judgment of 14 July 2022, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission , C‑371/21 P, EU:C:2022:566, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

110 In the present case, it must be observed that, as regards the second part of the fourth ground of appeal, as the REA submits, first, that, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court merely summarises the appellant’s second plea in its action at first instance and does not make any assessment in that regard and, second, that the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 61 of that judgment constitutes an assessment of the facts and evidence in that action. The appellant does not explain how that assessment is the result of a distortion by the General Court of that evidence.

111 Similarly, as regards the third part of the fourth ground of appeal, even if the appellant seeks, by its arguments, to establish a distortion by the General Court of the email of 8 October 2018, it must be pointed out, as noted in paragraph 108 of the present judgment, that the distortion must be obvious from the documents in the file submitted to the Court of Justice. In that regard, in accordance with settled case-law, the review carried out by the Court of Justice when examining a ground of appeal alleging distortion of the facts is limited to verifying that the General Court, in relying on those facts, did not manifestly exceed the limits of a reasonable assessment of those facts, with the result that it is not sufficient to demonstrate that a document could be the subject of a different interpretation from that adopted by the General Court (judgment of 14 July 2022, SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission , C‑371/21 P, EU:C:2022:566, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

112 In finding, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘it is not possible to find that the wording of the REA’s [email] of 8 October 2018 contradicts that which appears, inter alia, in the REA’s subsequent letter of 21 August 2019’ and that ‘it is by no means excluded that the documents required must make it possible to verify the actual dates of the secondments’, the General Court did not manifestly exceed the limits of a reasonable assessment of the documents at issue and, consequently, did not distort them.

113 As the General Court rightly pointed out in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, although the email of 8 October 2018 mentions that a check is not intended to verify the actual costs incurred in connection with travel, since the corresponding costs are assumed on a flat-rate basis, it is by no means excluded that the documents required make it possible to verify the actual dates of the secondments. In that regard, the verification of the dates of the flights taken by the seconded researchers, by means, inter alia, of boarding passes, makes it possible to verify that those researchers actually attended the host university and that the secondments did indeed take place in accordance with the requirements of the grant agreement.

114 In the present case, as the General Court noted in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, while it is true that the appellant produced employment contracts which had been concluded with the researchers concerned, those contracts do not make it possible to establish that those researchers had actually been seconded, in particular because the dates to which those contracts refer do not correspond specifically to the dates of secondments, with the result that the production of additional documents, such as boarding passes, was entirely necessary in order to demonstrate that those secondments in fact took place.

115 In that regard, by maintaining that the General Court should have concluded that the wording of the REA’s email of 8 October 2018 contradicts that which appears, inter alia, in the REA’s subsequent letter of 21 August 2019, by which the REA launched a financial audit of the grant agreement, the appellant is in fact challenging the General Court’s assessment of the probative value of the evidence submitted by the REA. Such arguments are, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 109 of the present judgment, inadmissible at the appeal stage, since the appellant has neither demonstrated a distortion of the evidence in question nor put forward arguments from which it may be concluded that the General Court infringed the rules relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence.

116 In those circumstances, the second and third parts of the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.