Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 November 2025

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 2 TEU, of points 5 and 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted at the European Council meeting held in Strasbourg on 9 December 1989, and of Articles 3 and 5 to 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between HZ, a judge of the Tribunalul Galați (Regional Court, Galați, Romania), and that court concerning the payment of financial compensation in respect of the hours worked by HZ to perform the additional tasks for which he has been responsible since 2019.

Legal context

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

11 HZ has served as a judge of the Tribunalul Galați (Regional Court, Galați) as from 1 April 2017. Since 2019, that court has been understaffed due to various judicial posts remaining vacant.

12 During the period from 6 May 2019 to 15 March 2020, HZ worked in the administrative and tax litigation division of that court; next, he was assigned to the first civil section of that court as from 16 March 2020 until 1 September 2021. According to the applicant in the main proceedings, the situation as regards posts allocated and filled within the administrative and tax litigation division was as follows. During the period 2019 to 2021, nine posts were allocated, of which seven were filled and two remained vacant; during 2022, nine posts were allocated, of which five were filled and four remained vacant; and during the period from 16 March 2020 to 1 September 2021, while the table of staff of the first civil section provided for 14 judicial posts, only 12 were filled, including 2 which were filled by judges on parental leave.

13 HZ submits that, since 2019, he has performed not only the tasks associated with his own post, but also, in part, those tasks linked to vacant posts and split among the judges who are in active service at his court. Taking the view that that situation resulted in overtime being worked, HZ sought remuneration for that overtime in the form of a share of the net salaries and allowances attached to the vacant posts, divided by the number of judges in active service, for the period from 2019 to 2021 and for the following years, until those vacant posts are filled.

14 By judgment of 11 January 2023, the Tribunalul Bucureşti (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania) dismissed HZ’s action seeking payment of that remuneration as unfounded on the ground, inter alia, that, under Article 35(1) of OUG No 114/2018, point 1 of Article II of OUG No 130/2021 and point 1 of Article II of OUG No 168/2022, additional hours worked outside of normal working hours by staff covered by the budget line for executive or managerial positions and hours worked on weekly rest days, public holidays and other days during which, under the rules in force, no hours of work can be performed during normal working time, may be compensated only by a commensurate rest period.

15 HZ brought an appeal against that judgment before the Curtea de Apel București (Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania), which is the referring court, claiming, inter alia, that the faculty of compensating overtime thus worked by a rest period is merely theoretical in the light of his actual workload.

16 Observing that the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court, Romania) has held that the financial stability of judges is one of the guarantees of judicial independence, the referring court notes that, by way of derogation from the regime established in Article 21 of Framework Law No 153/2017, OUGs No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022 provide that, for the years 2019 to 2023, overtime worked by judges may be compensated solely by granting a rest period.

17 That court notes, first, that the legislation on overtime applicable to all salaried staff paid from public funds does not remove the right to compensation, but merely limits the form it can take to the grant of a rest period.

18 That being so, according to the applicant in the main proceedings, a situation of chronic understaffing within a court leads to an increase in the tasks to be carried out by each of the judges in active service at that court and to an increase in the risk of error and of the disciplinary liability of judges being incurred. Furthermore, in such a situation, the grant of a compensatory rest period may prove to be purely theoretical, so that the remuneration granted to judges might appear not to be commensurate with the responsibilities arising from their functions.

19 Second, that court considers that the treatment of overtime must be assessed on the basis of the actual volume of work at a given time and not only on the basis of the fill rate of posts.

20 In any event, that court states, first, that the employer of the applicant in the main proceedings never refused him any request for leave or compensatory rest days for the overtime worked and, second, that HZ did not submit a request to that effect for the period at issue in the main proceedings.

21 In those circumstances, the Curtea de Apel București (Court of Appeal, Bucharest) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, [read in the light of] Article 2 TEU, points 5 and 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and Articles 3 [and 5 to 7] of Directive [2003/88], be interpreted, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes national legislation that prohibits the payment of overtime worked by a judge owing to staff shortages at the court where he or she works, in a situation in which compensation solely by [a rest period] corresponding to the amount of [additional hours worked beyond normal working time], and on weekly rest days and public holidays, if applied, would have a negative effect on the annual leave provided for by law?’

Consideration of the question referred

22 As a preliminary point, it is apparent from the order for reference that HZ is seeking payment of part of the net salaries and allowances attached to judicial posts which were not filled at his court during the period from 2019 to 2022, and for the following years, until those posts are actually filled, as remuneration for the hours he allegedly worked in order to perform the tasks which would otherwise have fallen to the judges whose posts remained vacant during that period and beyond.

23 The referring court states, first, that HZ did not assert his right to the grant of a rest period with his employer, pursuant to OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022, for the overtime he allegedly worked during the period at issue in the main proceedings. In that regard, there is nothing in the file before the Court to indicate that his employer deterred or even prevented him from exercising that right. Second, that court observes that the amount of overtime was not recorded, either by the employer or by the applicant in the main proceedings himself, since he relied on the number of vacant judicial posts at his court for each year referred to in his application to estimate the additional workload which allegedly fell to her.

24 In that regard, it should be noted that the specific features of the duties of the profession of judge, which are closely linked to the status of that profession, may prevent the precise recording of their working time in terms of normal working hours and overtime. Thus, judicial activity includes features which may make it difficult, if not impossible, to measure that working time in accordance with the detailed rules applicable to other professions. The judicial handling of cases may be subject to mandatory statutory time limits, may be dealt with under expedited procedures, in particular in proceedings for interim measures, and must meet, in general, the requirement to deliver judgment within a reasonable time, all being circumstances which require the performance of tasks outside normal working hours on a regular basis. Similarly, attendance at hearings cannot be restricted by precise timings over which the judge, or the court at which he or she works, would have full control.

25 In any event, as the referring court points out, the need to perform additional work should be examined according to the actual volume of work of a judge at a given time and cannot be assumed or estimated solely on the basis of the fill rate of posts at the court to which that judge is assigned. In addition, according to the Romanian Government, the workload of judges is quantified by the Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii (Supreme Council of the Judiciary, Romania), which ensures that the workload is shared between the courts in a balanced manner and determines the number of judges to be assigned to each of them according to that workload.

26 However, as the referring court itself points out, that court has been seised by HZ of an application for financial compensation for the overtime he allegedly worked during the period referred to in his application, not on the basis of the general scheme for overtime laid down in Article 21(1) to (6) of Framework Law No 153/2017 applicable before the introduction of the derogations provided for by OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022, but by setting the monetary value of his claims on the basis of the net salaries and allowances attached to the judicial posts which were not filled at his court divided by the number of judicial posts actually filled.

27 In that regard, it must be recalled that the concept of ‘pay’ must be interpreted broadly as covering, in particular, any consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his or her employment from his or her employer, and irrespective of whether it is received under a contract of employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis (judgment of 22 February 2024, Randstad Empleo and Others , C‑649/22, EU:C:2024:156, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

28 It must be stated that, by seeking payment for overtime, calculated on the basis of the net salaries and allowances attached to posts which are not filled at his court, without, however, having asserted the right to a rest period commensurate with that overtime or even the right to financial compensation provided for by the general scheme laid down in Article 21(1) to (6) of Framework Law No 153/2017, it appears that HZ, by his action before the referring court, seems to call into question the remuneration which he is entitled to as a judge of a court in a situation of understaffing rather than the nature of the compensation payable to him for having worked overtime.

29 In that context, the referring court wishes to know whether the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings is compatible with judicial independence as guaranteed by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 2 TEU, points 5 and 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and Articles 3 and 5 to 7 of Directive 2003/88.

30 As regards the rules which the referring court seeks to have interpreted by the Court, it should be noted, first, that it does not specify the extent to which point 7 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, under which the improvement of the living and working conditions of workers of the European Union should lead to the development of certain aspects of employment regulations, is relevant for the purpose of answering that question.

31 Second, as regards Directive 2003/88, it should be recalled that it does not apply, in principle, except in the case of paid annual leave, to the remuneration of workers (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2021, Ministrstvo za obrambo , C‑742/19, EU:C:2021:597, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

32 It is true that the referring court appears to consider that compensation by means of a rest period commensurate with the additional hours worked beyond normal working time and during weekly rest days and public holidays may, if it were possible to implement, adversely affect the right to statutory annual leave.

33 However, there is nothing in the file before the Court concerning the reasons why the national legislation providing for that compensation might adversely affect that right. In those circumstances, it cannot be considered that the question referred requires an examination in the light of the provisions of Directive 2003/88.

34 In the light of the foregoing observations, it must be held that, by the question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 2 TEU and point 5 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, by providing solely for the grant of a compensatory rest period in respect of working time which a judge performs in order to carry out tasks which fall to a vacant post at his or her court, in addition to those required of him or her in respect of the post which he or she occupies, excludes any financial compensation for work performed with a view to carrying out those additional tasks.

35 From the outset, it must be borne in mind that Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection that individuals derive from EU law to national courts and tribunals and to the Court of Justice. To that end, maintaining the independence of those bodies is essential (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

36 The requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, indeed forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and to a fair hearing, which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values, set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, which are common to the Member States and which define the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order, will be safeguarded (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

37 The concept of the independence of the courts presupposes, in particular, that the body concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions. Like the protection against removal from office of the members of the body concerned, the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence (judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses , C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 44 and 45 ; of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel , C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 66 ; and of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 49 ).

38 Admittedly, the Member States enjoy a broad discretion in their choice of public expenditure, especially when determining the method of calculating that expenditure and, in particular, the remuneration of judges (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 51 ).

39 That being so, national rules on judges’ remuneration must not give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before them (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

40 In particular, as is mentioned in paragraph 37 of the present judgment, the receipt by judges of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.

41 In that regard, quite apart from the fair nature, within the meaning of point 5 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, of the remuneration which judges ought to receive, their level of remuneration must moreover be sufficiently high, in the light of the socio-economic context of the Member State concerned, in order to confer on them a certain economic independence to protect them against any external interference or pressure that might undermine the neutrality of the judicial decisions they must take. Thus, the level of that remuneration must be such as to protect judges against the risk of corruption (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

42 Therefore, while the remuneration of judges may vary according to seniority and the nature of the functions entrusted to them, it must always be commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out in a State governed by the rule of law (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 60 ).

43 In order to assess whether judges’ remuneration is adequate, account must be taken not only of the ordinary basic salary, the various bonuses and allowances that judges receive, in particular in respect of their seniority or the duties entrusted to them, but also of any exemption from social security contributions (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 61 ).

44 In addition, the assessment of whether judges’ remuneration is adequate must be made having regard to the economic, social and financial situation of the Member State concerned. From that point of view, it is appropriate to compare the average remuneration of judges to the average salary in that State (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 62 ).

45 Furthermore, in order to guarantee judicial independence and, more broadly, the quality of justice in a State governed by the rule of law, justice policies should also consider the salaries of other legal professions in order to make the judicial profession attractive to highly qualified legal practitioners. It cannot, however, be inferred from this that the principle of judicial independence precludes the remuneration of judges from being established at a level lower than that of the average remuneration of other legal professionals, in particular those exercising a liberal profession, such as lawyers, where they are clearly in a different situation from that of judges (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 63 ).

46 In any event, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, the detailed rules for determining the remuneration of judges should not give rise to doubts as to the independence of the courts in relation to the legislature and the executive (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 50 ).

47 Last, the detailed rules for determining judges’ remuneration must be capable of being subject to effective judicial review in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the law of the Member State concerned (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 64 ).

48 As regards the adoption of a legislative measure which, by derogating from national legislation and in circumstances of understaffing, provides that the additional workload of a judge stemming from the performance of tasks linked to a vacant judicial post within a court is subject to the grant of compensatory rest, and not to financial remuneration, such a derogating measure must meet a number of requirements in order to comply with the principle of judicial independence.

49 First, a derogating measure such as that referred to in the preceding paragraph must, like the general rules on the determination of judges’ remuneration from which it derogates, be provided for by law. In addition, the detailed rules for the remuneration of judges provided for by that derogating measure must be objective, foreseeable and transparent (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 66 ).

50 Second, that derogating measure must be justified by an objective in the general interest, such as a requirement to eliminate an excessive government deficit, within the meaning of Article 126(1) TFEU (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

51 The budgetary reasons justifying the adoption of a measure derogating from the rules of ordinary law on judges’ remuneration must be clearly set out. In addition, subject to duly justified exceptional circumstances, those measures must not be aimed specifically at members of the national courts alone and must form part of a more general framework seeking to ensure that a wider set of members of the national civil service contribute to the budgetary effort which is being pursued (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses , C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 49 ; of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel , C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 67 ; and of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 69 ).

52 Thus, when a Member State adopts budgetary restriction measures affecting its officials and public servants, it may, in a society in which solidarity prevails, as stated in Article 2 TEU, decide to apply those measures also to national judges (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 71 ).

53 Third, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which constitutes a general principle of EU law, a derogating measure such as that referred to in paragraph 48 above must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of general interest pursued, be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to attain that objective and not be disproportionate to that objective, which means that the importance of that objective must be weighed against the seriousness of the interference with the principle of judicial independence (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 72 ).

54 On that basis, that measure, if it appears such as to allow the attainment of the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 50 above, must nevertheless remain exceptional and temporary, inasmuch as it must not apply beyond the period necessary for the attainment of the legitimate objective pursued, such as the elimination of an excessive government deficit (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 73 ).

55 Furthermore, the impact of that measure on judges’ remuneration must not be disproportionate to the objective pursued (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 74 ).

56 Fourth, the preservation of judicial independence requires that, notwithstanding the application to the judiciary of a budgetary restriction measure, and even if such a measure were linked to the existence of a serious economic, social and financial crisis, the level of remuneration of judges is always commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out, so that they remain shielded from external interventions or pressure liable to jeopardise their independent judgment and to influence their decisions, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 above (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 75 ).

57 Fifth, a derogating measure such as that set out in paragraph 48 above must also be capable of being subject to effective judicial review (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 76 ).

58 Although in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU it is not for the Court to apply the rules of EU law to a particular case, it may, in order to provide an answer of use to the referring courts, provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main proceedings and on the written observations before it, in order to enable those courts to give judgment (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė , C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

59 In the present case, it will be for the referring court to confirm the following elements set out in the order for reference and in the written observations submitted to the Court.

60 In the first place, the national measure excluding remuneration for overtime worked by a judge was introduced by OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022 for the period from 2019 to 2022. It is apparent from the order for reference that those acts are legislative in nature and that the derogation which they contain is limited to the year covered by each of those acts.

61 In the second place, according to the preamble to OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022, the adoption of those acts is justified by ‘the requirement to comply with the objective of a deficit of less than 3% of [GDP] laid down by the [FEU Treaty]’. As recalled in paragraph 50 above, the requirement to eliminate an excessive government deficit, within the meaning of Article 126(1) TFEU, constitutes an objective of general interest. That being so, it will be necessary to ascertain whether or not the vacant posts are budgeted, it being understood that, in the affirmative, the systematic and consistent pursuit of the objective pursued would be called into question.

62 In addition, under the provisions of OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022 introducing the derogation from the regime applicable to overtime as referred to in the legal framework of the order for reference, those provisions apply to ‘staff covered by the budget line for executive or managerial positions’. Consequently, those measures are not specifically directed at judges.

63 In the third place, as regards the proportionality of the measure at issue in the main proceedings, it should be noted, subject to verification by the referring court, first, that it may prove to be such as to ensure attainment of the objective of correcting public deficits and that it may be necessary in the light of the objective to be achieved.

64 Second, as regards proportionality stricto sensu, it will be for that court to establish that the measure at issue in the main proceedings does not constitute a direct reduction in the remuneration of judges, by ascertaining whether OUG No 114/2018, No 130/2021 and No 168/2022 do indeed merely limit the type of compensation for overtime worked to the grant of a commensurate rest period.

65 In the light of the risks – identified by the referring court – to which judges may be exposed on account of performing additional work, it will be for that court to ascertain, based on the facts, whether the judges concerned are not, in practice, deterred or even prevented from using that rest period.

66 In any event, in so far as that court is uncertain as to whether the remuneration received by HZ is adequate, it is apparent from paragraphs 44 and 56 above that, as regards judges, it will have to carry out its assessment of that question by taking into account the economic, social and financial situation of the Member State concerned by comparing the average remuneration of judges with the average salary in that State.

67 Referring to the EU Justice Scoreboard for 2024, the European Commission states, in its written observations, that a Romanian judge receives, at the beginning of his or her career, an average salary equal to 2.9 times the average annual gross salary in Romania, which it is, however, for the referring court to verify.

68 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 2 TEU and point 5 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude national legislation which, by providing solely for the grant of a compensatory rest period in respect of the working time which a judge performs in order to carry out tasks which fall to a vacant post at his or her court, in addition to those required of him or her in respect of the post which he or she occupies, excludes any financial compensation for work performed with a view to carrying out those additional tasks, provided that that judge can actually use the compensatory rest period which he or she has been granted and that that legislation does not have the effect of undermining the commensurate relationship between his or her remuneration and the importance of his or her functions.

Costs

69 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.