Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 17 December 2025

Uitspraak

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

17 December 2025 (^*)

( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’ – Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Concept of ‘association’ – Obligation to state reasons – Error of assessment – Proportionality – Right to property – Freedom to conduct a business )

In Case T‑268/24,

Igor Rotenberg, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, G. Lansky and P. Goeth, lawyers, and S. Gee, Barrister-at-Law,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by E. Kübler and A. Antoniadis, acting as Agents, and by B. Maingain and S. Remy, lawyers,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed, at the time of deliberation, by M. Brkan, acting as President, I. Gâlea (Rapporteur) and S.L. Kalėda, Judges,

Registrar: I. Kurme, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:

–        the application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 22 May 2024,

–        the statements of modification lodged at the Court Registry on 25 November 2024 and 21 May 2025,

further to the hearing on 1 July 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Igor Rotenberg, seeks the annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/847) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/849) (together, ‘the March 2024 acts’), (ii) after a first modification of the application, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455) (together, ‘the September 2024 acts’), and (iii) after a second modification of the application, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/528) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/527) (together, ‘the March 2025 acts’), in so far as the March 2024 acts, the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts as a whole (together, ‘the contested acts’) maintain his name on the lists annexed to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13) and to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1) (together, ‘the lists at issue’). In the second statement of modification, the applicant also submitted a new head of claim seeking the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/904 of 13 May 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP and of Council Regulation (EU) 2025/903 of 13 May 2025 (‘the May 2025 acts’).

 Background to the dispute

2        The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

3        On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis, inter alia, of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16). That same day, it adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

4        On 25 February 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria pursuant to which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be subject to the restrictive measures at issue.

5        Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as thus amended, provides as follows:

‘1.      All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:

(a)      natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;

…

(d)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine;

…

(f)      natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine; …

…

and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.      No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.’

6        The detailed rules governing that freezing of funds are laid down in the subsequent paragraphs of that article.

7        Regulation No 269/2014, also as amended, requires that measures to freeze funds be adopted and defines the detailed rules for such freezing in terms that are essentially identical to those in Decision 2014/145, as amended. Article 3(1) of that regulation largely reproduces Article 2(1) of that decision.

8        On 8 April 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/582 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 55) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/581 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 3). Among other things, the Council added the applicant’s name to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2014/145.

9        On 14 September 2022, the Council renewed the restrictive measures against the applicant on the same grounds as those underpinning his initial listing. In that regard, it adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1).

10      By letter of 20 September 2022, the Council sent the applicant the evidence file WK 5025/2022 INIT (‘evidence file 1’) on which it had based its decision.

11      On 25 November 2022, the applicant brought an action for annulment of Decision 2022/1530 and Implementing Regulation 2022/1529, in so far as they prolonged the application of restrictive measures against him, and for annulment of the decision to maintain his name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures adopted by the Council which was notified by letter of 16 September 2022. That case gave rise to the judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council (T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398), dismissing the applicant’s action.

12      By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to maintain his name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures pursuant to the contested acts, on the basis of additional documentary evidence contained in document WK 17696/2022 INIT (‘evidence file 2’), a copy of which was attached to that letter.

13      By letter of 6 February 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to prolong the application of the restrictive measures imposed on him, based on amended grounds. On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1). By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it had decided to maintain his name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures.

14      By application of 24 May 2023, the applicant sought the annulment of Decision 2023/572 and Implementing Regulation 2023/571. The case was registered under case number T‑284/23. Following the applicant’s withdrawal, that case was removed from the register by order of 1 October 2024, Rotenberg v Council (T‑284/23, not published, EU:T:2024:679).

15      By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him on the basis of additional documentary evidence contained in document WK 8102/2023 INIT (‘evidence file 3’), a copy of which was attached to that letter.

16      By letters of 10 July 2023 and 18 August 2023, the Council sent the applicant additional evidence contained in documents WK 5142/2023 INIT (‘evidence file 4’) and WK 5142/2023 ADD1 (‘evidence file 5’).

17      On 13 September 2023, the Council prolonged the application of the restrictive measures against the applicant by adopting Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3).

18      The applicant replied to the Council’s letters informing him of the proposed prolongation of the restrictive measures and submitted observations by letters of 31 August 2023, 31 October 2023 and 19 February 2024.

19      By letter of 8 February 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to prolong the application of the restrictive measures against him on the basis of additional documentary evidence contained in document WK 5142/2023 ADD2 (‘evidence file 6’), a copy of which was attached to that letter.

20      On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the March 2024 acts. The grounds for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue – which were identical to those set out in the acts adopted in September 2023, referred to in paragraph 17 above – were as follows:

‘Igor Rotenberg is a Russian leading businessperson, and the oldest son and heir to Arkady Rotenberg, a prominent Russian businessperson and former co-owner of the SGM (Stroygazmontazh) group. He is former owner of Gazprom Drilling and shareholder in Platon Electronic Toll Collection system. The Rotenbergs are closely associated with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. Due to his past and current positions in leading Russian enterprises, which have been receiving large state contracts, and his close ties with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Igor Rotenberg continues to benefit from Russian decision-makers and the Government of the Russian Federation, both responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, he is a natural person associated with Arkady Rotenberg and the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, both listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’

 Events subsequent to the bringing of the action

21      On 12 September 2024, by means of the September 2024 acts, the Council prolonged the application of the restrictive measures against the applicant, giving the following amended statement of reasons in Annex I, line 921, of the list:

‘Igor Rotenberg is a leading Russian businessperson, and the oldest son and heir to Arkady Rotenberg, a prominent Russian businessperson and former co-owner of the SGM (Stroygazmontazh) group. He is the former owner of Gazprom Drilling and a former shareholder in Platon Electronic Toll Collection system. The Rotenbergs are closely associated with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Due to his past and current positions in leading Russian enterprises, which have been receiving large state contracts, and his close ties with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, Igor Rotenberg continues to benefit from Russian decision-makers and the Government of the Russian Federation, both responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, he is a natural person associated with Arkady Rotenberg and the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, both listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’

22      By letter of 13 September 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain the restrictive measures against him. The Council did not produce any additional evidence.

23      By letter of 23 October 2024, the applicant asked the Council for access, if necessary, to all new documents in his file. By letter of 28 October 2024, the Council confirmed that all materials had been forwarded in its earlier correspondence and that it was not in possession of any new materials.

24      On 5 November 2024, the applicant submitted detailed observations in response to the Council’s letter of 13 September 2024 announcing that the restrictive measures would be maintained against him.

25      On 10 February 2025, the Council sent a letter to the applicant informing him of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him. The Council also attached a further evidence file, document WK 1370/25 INIT. In addition, it provided the applicant with the following draft amended grounds for listing:

‘Igor Rotenberg is a leading Russian businessperson, and the oldest son of Arkady Rotenberg, a prominent Russian businessperson and former co-owner of the SGM (Stroygazmontazh) group. He is the former owner of Gazprom Drilling and a former shareholder in Platon Electronic Toll Collection system. The Rotenbergs are closely associated with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Due to his past and current positions in leading Russian enterprises, which have been receiving large state contracts, and his close ties with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, Igor Rotenberg continues to benefit from Russian decision makers and the Government of the Russian Federation, both responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, he is a natural person associated with Arkady Rotenberg and the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, both listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’

26      On 23 February 2025, the applicant submitted his observations to the Council.

27      On 17 March 2025, the Council informed the applicant that it had decided to maintain his name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures on the basis of the grounds set out in paragraph 25 above. It also replied to the observations which the applicant had previously submitted in November 2024 and to his comments concerning the two exhibits in the evidence file WK 1370/25, which the Council had notified to him beforehand on 10 February 2025.

28      On 13 May 2025, the Council adopted the May 2025 acts, by which it amended the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 (‘criterion (g)’).

 Forms of order sought

29      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested acts;

–        order the Council to pay the costs.

30      The Council contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

31      In support of his action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law, alleging (i) that Article 1(1)(b) and (d) and Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145 are unlawful; (ii) infringement of the obligation to state reasons and breach of the right to effective judicial protection; (iii) manifest error of assessment; and (iv) breach of fundamental rights, in particular his freedom to conduct a business and his right to property, and breach of the principle of proportionality.

 Admissibility of the head of claim seeking annulment of the May 2025 acts

32      The Court considers it appropriate to examine, first of all, the admissibility of the new head of claim put forward at the stage of the second statement of modification.

33      In the second statement of modification, the applicant submitted a new head of claim seeking the annulment of the May 2025 acts if and in so far as those acts were to be regarded as applicable. In essence, he questions the lawfulness of the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by the May 2025 acts, and, in the alternative, requests that the March 2025 acts be declared inapplicable under Article 277 TFEU.

34      In that regard, the Council stated at the hearing and in its written pleadings that the applicant was not included on the lists at issue under criterion (g) and that the May 2025 acts are not applicable in the present case.

35      At the hearing, the applicant stated that he agreed with the Council’s analysis, but that he maintained the new head of claim.

36      That head of claim must, however, be rejected as inadmissible since it is common ground that the applicant’s name was not included or maintained on the lists at issue under criterion (g), with the result that the May 2025 acts do not affect his legal situation.

 Offer of evidence

37      At the hearing on 1 July 2025, the Council submitted a request under Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court to be allowed to submit the evidence file WK 1370/2025, which had not been made available to the Court during the written exchanges between the parties concerning the second statement of modification, so that that file could be taken into consideration in the examination of the present action. The applicant also asked to be allowed to submit a further offer of evidence.

38      According to the applicant, the offer of evidence submitted by the Council must be declared inadmissible. The Council contends that the applicant’s offer of evidence is inadmissible and, in any event, not relevant to the arguments put forward by him.

39      The new offer of evidence made by the Council concerns, in particular, two press articles. The first, published in June 2024, reports on the actions taken by the Ukrainian Government against the Rotenberg family, while the second, published in June 2023, describes that family’s alleged efforts to circumvent the restrictive measures imposed by the European Union.

40      Those two documents make up the evidence file WK 1370/2025, which was notified to the applicant on 10 February 2025 as part of the periodic review under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, so that it is intended to support the March 2025 acts. However, that file was not sent to the Court during the written part of the procedure.

41      In that regard, it should be noted that, as the Council pointed out in its observations on the second statement of modification, the existence of investigations and the reasons for those investigations in Ukraine are not the reason why the restrictive measures against the applicant were renewed by way of the March 2025 acts. Therefore, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the two documents making up the evidence file WK 1370/2025, it must be held that they are of no account, since they do not constitute the grounds on which the Council relied in order to adopt the contested acts.

42      For its part, the new offer of evidence made by the applicant concerns payment orders relating to the sale of a 23.5% stake in Platon and was produced as an annex to the reply and to the second statement of modification.

43      It should be noted that the most recent payments date from 19 and 31 March 2025 and 25 April 2025, so that they post-date the most recent acts in respect of which annulment is sought, namely the March 2025 acts. Consequently, the Council cannot be criticised for not having taken them into consideration when adopting those acts. For the same reason, since that evidence does not relate to the contested acts, it should not be taken into account.

44      Thus, in the light of the date of the payments referred to in paragraph 43 above, and without it being necessary to rule on their admissibility as an offer of evidence, it must be held that they have no bearing on the examination of the legality of the contested acts and are therefore not relevant to the present dispute.

 The first plea in law, raising a plea of illegality in respect of Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145

45      The applicant submits that, if the Court were to consider the mere involvement in companies which have entered into public service or public works contracts with the Russian State to satisfy the listing criteria laid down in the second limb of Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145 (individually, ‘criterion (d)’ and ‘criterion (f)’ and, together, ‘criteria (d) and (f)’), without the benefit required by those criteria having to reach a certain threshold exceeding the benefit usually procured in identical circumstances, he raises a plea of illegality in respect of those criteria under Article 277 TFEU. According to the applicant, such an interpretation would infringe Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and would run counter to the objectives of the restrictive measures.

46      The Council argues that that plea of illegality is unfounded.

47      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

48      Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of an act against which it can bring an action, the validity of previous acts of the institutions which form the legal basis of the contested act, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general act claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested individual decision and the general act in question (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

49      According to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union’s legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

50      The fact remains that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the criteria for inclusion on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures and the procedures for adopting those measures (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). Consequently, rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures – such as the provisions of the contested acts laying down the criterion concerned by the plea of illegality – are subject to a limited judicial review, restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, that there has been no error of law, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

51      In the present case, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant is based on the premiss that the concept of ‘benefit’, for the purposes of criteria (d) and (f), is to be interpreted as covering any benefit, without that benefit having to reach a certain threshold exceeding an ordinary benefit.

52      However, such an interpretation cannot be upheld.

53      In that regard, it has been held that the concept of ‘benefit’, for the purposes of criteria (d) and (f), is to be construed as a profit of any kind. Thus, the acquisition of control of certain undertakings may in itself appear to be a profit, although that may not involve immediate financial profits (judgments of 7 June 2023, Shakutin v Council, T‑141/21, not published, EU:T:2023:303, paragraphs 172 and 173, and of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council, T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 62).

54      Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Court has already held that the mere fact of being successful in one or several calls for tender is not in itself sufficient for it to be concluded that there are links enabling the person concerned to benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Russian Government, within the meaning of the applicable criteria (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 March 2022, Sabra v Council, T‑249/20, EU:T:2022:140, paragraph 215, and of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council, T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 64). However, the concept of ‘benefit’ and the issue of its scope must be interpreted in the light of the particulars of the case, having regard to the situation in Ukraine and the objectives pursued by the contested acts, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine (judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council, T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 64).

55      Accordingly, the plea of illegality in respect of Article 2(1)(d) and (f) of Decision 2014/145 rests on a false premiss and must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

 The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and to conduct a periodic review and breach of the right to effective judicial protection

56      The applicant submits that the contested acts do not explain why his name was maintained on the lists at issue notwithstanding his changed circumstances and claims that the Council infringed the obligation to conduct a periodic review. Moreover, the statement of reasons provided by the grounds of the contested acts is contradictory, incomplete, stereotypical, laconic and based on inaccurate and incorrect facts. The Council fails to explain how the applicant benefits from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation when he no longer holds any stake or holds only a minority stake in the companies referred to in the grounds. In addition, the Council does not show how being the son of Arkady Rotenberg is relevant having regard to the listing criteria applied. Nor does it show how ‘the Rotenbergs’ are closely associated with President Putin. The applicant also maintains that he does not understand how entering into large state contracts could be grounds for considering that he contributed to or supported Russia’s actions and received an undue benefit as compared with contracts awarded to third parties.

57      In the second statement of modification, the applicant reiterates that the statement of reasons for maintaining his name on the lists at issue in the March 2025 acts is insufficient and lacks specificity. In that regard, he argues that that statement of reasons is incorrect because the Council does not identify any current position held by him and acknowledges that he is the former owner of Gazprom and Platon.

58      The Council disputes those arguments.

59      According to settled case-law, the right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons (see judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

60      Furthermore, it should be recalled that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the act in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures for the purpose of assessing whether they are well founded and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (judgments of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 25, and of 6 September 2023, Pumpyanskiy v Council, T‑291/22, not published, EU:T:2023:499, paragraph 25).

61      The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the act, the nature of the grounds relied on and the interest which the addressees of the act, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. In particular, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that act, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. Consequently, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure taken against him or her (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraphs 53 and 54; see, also, judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

62      Finally, it is important to note that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (judgments of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 60, and of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council, T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 111).

63      In the present case, the statement of reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by way of the contested acts is that set out in paragraphs 20, 21 and 25 above.

64      It is sufficiently clear from that statement of reasons that the Council maintained the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the ground that he is, first, among the persons benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, responsible for the annexation of Crimea or for the destabilisation of Ukraine, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f), and, secondly, among the natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons included on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, within the meaning of Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145 (‘the association criterion’).

65      Furthermore, contrary to the applicant’s claims, the circumstances set out in the statement of reasons are sufficiently clear, precise and non-stereotyped as to enable him to understand the reasons why his name was maintained on the lists at issue.

66      In particular, it is sufficiently clear from that statement of reasons that benefitting from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation consists, inter alia, in being the former owner of Gazprom Drilling, a shareholder in the Platon electronic toll collection system and, as regards the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts, a former shareholder of that Platon system. It is also apparent from the statement of reasons that, due to his past and current positions in leading Russian companies in receipt of large state contracts and his close ties with President Putin, the applicant continues to benefit from those decision-makers and from that government. The fact that the statement of reasons does not contain any further detail concerning, inter alia, those contracts cannot lead to a finding of infringement of the obligation to state reasons, since, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 61 above, the Council is not required to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, and the applicant was put in a position to understand the scope of the measures taken against him.

67      Similarly, the reasons relating to the criterion of the applicant’s association with Arkady Rotenberg and with President Putin are explicitly set out. In particular, on the one hand, they state that the applicant’s father is a prominent Russian businessman and former co-owner of the SGM (Stroygazmontazh) group and, on the other, they mention that the applicant has close ties with President Putin and that the companies he owned received large state contracts. Furthermore, the statement of reasons for the contested acts are part of the context of the grounds of the earlier acts, in particular those adopted in April and September 2022, which state that the applicant and his father co-own the SGM (Stroygazmontazh) group.

68      In addition, the deletion of the word ‘heir’ in the grounds of the March 2025 acts has no bearing on the clarity and sufficiency of the statement of reasons for those acts.

69      Consequently, since the applicant was put in a position to understand the scope of the measures taken against him, the fact that the statement of reasons does not go into further detail as to the benefits drawn from and the nature of the association at issue does not contravene the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons, as recalled in paragraphs 59 to 62 above.

70      Lastly, the applicant’s other arguments that he no longer holds any shares in the companies mentioned, that entering into large state contracts does not demonstrate that he supports Russia’s actions, that obtaining state contracts cannot be equated with an ‘undue’ benefit, that the grounds of the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts do not refer to any ‘current’ position and that the ties to his father are purely familial are part of the assessment of whether the grounds are well founded, not whether the statement of reasons is sufficient.

71      It must therefore be held that the statement of reasons for the contested acts is sufficiently clear and precise as to enable the applicant to ascertain the reasons which led the Council to take the view that maintaining his name on the lists at issue was justified, to challenge the lawfulness of those acts before the Courts of the European Union, and to enable the latter to exercise its power of review.

72      As regards the obligation to conduct a periodic review, it should be noted that the Council examined the applicant’s request for reconsideration and replied on 13 March 2024, concluding that the applicant’s observations did not alter its decision to maintain the restrictive measures against him. In particular, the Council stated that it had taken account, inter alia, of the fact that the sale of the applicant’s shares in certain companies was very recent and of his tendency to reinvest the proceeds of previous sales of shares in other Russian companies.

73      Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments that the statement of reasons for the contested acts is imprecise, and thus disregards the obligation to state reasons as well as his right to effective judicial protection, must be rejected.

74      Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected.

 The third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment

75      By his third plea, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Council made a manifest error of assessment in maintaining his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d) and (f). In that regard, he argues that the facts set out by the Council in the grounds of the contested acts are inaccurate and that he does not fulfil criteria (d) or (f) or the association criterion. He denies benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f) and he also denies being associated – within the meaning of the association criterion – with his father, Arkady Rotenberg, and with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.

76      The Council disputes those arguments.

77      First of all, it should be pointed out that the second plea in law must be regarded as alleging error of assessment and not manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).

78      Next, it should be pointed out that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires in particular that the EU judicature is to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the statement of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons – or, at the very least, one of those reasons deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision – are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 122).

79      It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 121; of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57; and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 123).

80      In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 115).

81      Furthermore, it must be observed that the situation of conflict involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).

82      It is in the light of those case-law considerations that the substance of the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

83      In the present case, the applicant was included on the lists at issue on account of the benefit he derives from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as his association with his father and President Putin.

84      In order to justify the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council relied on the following evidence.

85      Evidence file 1 contains nine items, namely:

–        an article from the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia concerning the applicant (exhibit 1);

–        an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes, dated 8 March 2018, providing an overview of the applicant’s assets and his revenue structure (exhibit 2);

–        an article published on the website of the daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, dated 21 September 2020, concerning the transfer of assets within the Rotenberg family in order to circumvent sanctions (exhibit 3);

–        an article published on the website of the daily newspaper The Washington Post, dated 5 October 2021, concerning the effect of the sanctions on oligarchs, particularly in relation to the circumvention of those sanctions (exhibit 4);

–        an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes, dated 22 February 2018, concerning the Russians who profit the most from state contracts and listing the applicant in tenth place on account of his 78.71% holding, as at 29 December 2017, in Gazprom Bureniya, the successful company in calls for tender issued by the state companies Gazprom and Rosneft in 2017 (exhibit 5);

–        a report, dated 29 July 2020, from the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the asset structure of Russian oligarchs, in particular on the art market and the use of those assets to undermine sanctions (exhibit 6);

–        an article published on the website ‘rbc.ru’, dated 13 January 2018, stating that the applicant is one of the three owners of Gazprom Drilling (exhibit 7);

–        an article published on the website ‘Fortune.com’, dated 23 February 2022, stating that the applicant is co-owner of the SGM group and is ‘a close associate of Putin’ (exhibit 8);

–        an article published on the website of the newspaper The Moscow Times, dated 17 November 2013, stating that the applicant benefitted from the Russian Government by winning a tender to build a highway (exhibit 9).

86      Evidence file 2 contains six items, namely:

–        an article published on the website of the magazine The Post Internazionale, dated 20 May 2022, stating that the applicant is the majority shareholder of Gazprom Drilling, which receives 95% of its orders from Gazprom, and discussing the circumvention of sanctions (exhibit 1);

–        an article published on the website ‘tass.ru’, dated 17 November 2022, stating that the applicant had been the main owner of Gazprom Drilling since 2018, holding 78.7% of its shares, and that he had withdrawn from the company’s capital in 2021 (exhibit 2);

–        an article published on the website ‘kommersant.ru’, dated 6 June 2022, stating that Arkady Rotenberg had transferred his shareholding in Gazprom to his son, who had withdrawn from the company’s capital in 2021 (exhibit 3);

–        an article published in the magazine The Times of Israel, dated 12 July 2022, concerning the ties between Russia’s Jewish oligarchs and Vladimir Putin and stating that the applicant’s net worth is one billion United States dollars (USD) (approximately EUR 860 million) (exhibit 4);

–        an article published on the website ‘prozakupki.info’, dated 29 June 2022, concerning the Rotenberg family and stating that the applicant holds shares in the Platon system (exhibit 5);

–        an article published on the website ‘59.ru’, dated 8 November 2022, stating that the applicant is one of the founders of the company RT-Invest Transport Systems LLC (‘RTITS’) (exhibit 6).

87      The Council also relied on the following items of evidence contained in evidence file 3:

–        an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes concerning the applicant’s net worth (exhibit 1);

–        an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes Russia, dated 10 April 2023, concerning the assets held by the Rotenberg family and the applicant’s position in Gazprom (exhibit 2);

–        an article published on the website of the magazine Forbes Russia, dated 18 December 2019, concerning the construction of the bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Crimea to Russia and the involvement of the Rotenberg family and the applicant (exhibit 3);

–        an article published in 2018 on the website of Delovoi Kvarta, reporting that, according to the magazine Forbes, the applicant had won most of the tenders organised by the Russian Federation (exhibit 4);

–        an article published on the website of the newspaper The Moscow Times, dated 28 January 2016, stating that the public contract awarded to RTITS, which operates the Platon system, runs until 2027 (exhibit 5);

–        an article published on the website ‘trans.info’ in 2018 concerning the Platon system (exhibit 6);

–        an article published on the website of Posle Media in 2023 concerning the Platon system (exhibit 7);

–        an article published on the website of the Carnegie Endowment, dated 11 October 2018, stating that there had been no call for tenders for the Platon system (exhibit 8).

88      The Council also relies on evidence files 4, 5 and 6. Evidence file 4 contains documents relating to the business environment and economic reality in Russia. Evidence file 5 contains documents, reports, extracts from books and press articles relating to the state of affairs in and the economy of the Russian Federation, including an article from the website of Proekt, dated 31 July 2023, concerning the role of Russian oligarchs in the war in Ukraine (exhibit 1) and a book published in 2021 about the Rotenberg family (exhibit 12). Evidence file 6 contains several documents, reports and press articles concerning the economy and budget of the Russian Federation and the methods used to circumvent the effects of the restrictive measures.

89      The Court considers it relevant to examine, first of all, the maintenance of the applicant’s listing in the light of the concept of ‘benefitting’ ‘from Russian decision-makers’ or ‘from the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f).

90      The applicant denies that he benefits from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation. He states that the contested acts contain no reference to the companies in which he purportedly plays a leading role and which supposedly receive state contracts. The applicant maintains that he no longer has any control over the companies SGM and Gazprom Drilling.

91      First, he states that he sold the shares he held in Gazprom Drilling on 26 July 2021 and therefore denies having control of that company. Secondly, he states that he sold his shares in the SGM group in 2014 to his father, who himself sold them in 2019, with the result that, as at 21 November 2019, the sole shareholder of the SGM group was JSC Stroyinvestholding. Thirdly, he states that a 23.5% shareholding in RTITS does not allow him to control that company. He also mentions various companies in which, he claims, he no longer holds positions or owns shares and over which he has no power of control. Fourthly, the applicant submits that the extracts from various press articles and articles from certain websites contained in evidence file 3 are outdated, some having been published before the restrictive measures were imposed on him. In any event, those articles do not concern him directly. Similarly, evidence files 4, 5 and 6 provided by the Council either contain information pre-dating the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue or do not refer directly to him, but rather to Arkady or Boris Rotenberg. The applicant concludes from this that the Council has failed to adduce proof that he benefitted from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation and submits that he does not benefit from any state contract awarded to the companies mentioned in the grounds.

92      The applicant claims that he disposed of his holding in RTITS in December 2023 and that he notified the Council of the sale of the shares he held in that company on 7 February 2024. The Council’s use of the expression ‘former shareholder’ in connection with that company in the September 2024 acts suggests that the Council took account, albeit belatedly, of the cessation of that activity. Therefore, according to the applicant, the grounds do not identify any current position he holds and do not reflect the current state of affairs. The applicant also denies that the Council is entitled to rely on the documents contained in ‘the Rotenberg Files’ because those documents were not part of the evidence file produced by the Council when the contested acts were adopted.

93      The Council disputes those arguments.

94      It should be observed that, as regards the condition of benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, criteria (d) and (f) do not require that the persons or entities concerned benefit personally from the annexation of Crimea or from the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. It is sufficient that they benefit from one of the ‘Russian decision-makers’ or from ‘the Government’ responsible for those events, and it is not necessary to establish a link between the advantages enjoyed by the designated persons and the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 87).

95      As is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 53 above, the concept of ‘benefit’, for the purposes of criteria (d) and (f), is to be construed as a profit of any kind. Thus, according to that case-law, the acquisition of control of certain undertakings may in itself appear to be a profit, although that may not involve immediate financial profits.

96      It is also apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above that the mere fact of being successful in one or several calls for tender is not in itself sufficient for it to be concluded that there are links enabling the person concerned to benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of the applicable criteria. However, the concept of ‘benefit’ and the issue of its scope must be interpreted in the light of the particulars of the case, having regard to the situation in Ukraine and the objectives pursued by the contested acts, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine.

97      Furthermore, as regards the concepts of ‘Russian decision-makers’ and ‘Government of the Russian Federation’ at the root of the benefits enjoyed by the persons included on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d) and (f), it is necessary that those decision-makers or that government should, at the very least, have begun to prepare for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Where that condition is satisfied, it must be concluded that the recipients of those benefits cannot be unaware of the involvement of those decision-makers and of that government in the preparations, and can thus expect their resources, derived at least in part from those benefits, to be targeted by restrictive measures, with the aim of preventing them from being able to support the decision-makers or the government in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 91).

98      On that point, it must be noted that the restrictive measures at issue are a reaction to the policies and activities of the Russian authorities specifically as regards Ukraine, and not to the conduct of those authorities in general. However, those policies and activities have been implemented since the end of February 2014 and were amplified in 2021 to culminate in the military operation in Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022, the gravity of which situation persists to this day (see judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council, T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

99      Furthermore, the concept of ‘Russian decision-makers’, in the context of the restrictive measures at issue, refers to high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation, including the President of the Russian Federation and the members of the Russian Government (judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 92).

100    Moreover, it follows from recent case-law of the Court of Justice that it is possible for the Council to take into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as criterion (d), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the grounds underpinning that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council, C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

101    It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether the Council justified, to the requisite legal standard, that criteria (d) and (f) were met.

 The positions held by the applicant in Gazprom Drilling and SGM

102    It should be noted at the outset that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 94 above, the applicant’s argument that the fact of having entered into large state contracts does not permit the inference that he contributed to or supported the actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is ineffective.

103    Furthermore, in the first place, it is apparent from exhibit 7 in evidence file 1 that Gazprom Drilling is the largest drilling company in Russia, being the result of the merger of the various drilling departments of the companies in the Gazprom group, following the privatisation of its assets in 2010. The applicant’s father, who owned the company in 2011, transferred his shares to the applicant in 2014.

104    As pointed out by the Council, it follows from evidence file 3 that, even though the applicant no longer holds shares in Gazprom Drilling and SGM, those two companies received large state contracts from the Government of the Russian Federation and the applicant amassed a substantial fortune amounting to USD 1.3 billion (approximately EUR 1.12 billion) in May 2023 as a result of his previous involvement in those two companies.

105    Thus, the information before the Court shows that the applicant and the other shareholders of Gazprom Drilling sold their shares to JSC NPS Star on 26 July 2021 for 67.929 billion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 692 million) in total. Furthermore, the applicant states that he has not been a member of the board of directors of Gazprom Drilling since 2019, which is not disputed by the Council. On the date of the contested acts, the applicant was therefore a former owner of Gazprom Drilling. It is also apparent from exhibit 2 in evidence file 3 that the sale of the shares in that company and the dividends received between 2016 and 2021 ‘allowed [the applicant] to return to the Forbes list’, by becoming a billionaire only in 2018.

106    In the second place, the information before the Court shows that SGM managed, inter alia, the project to build the bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Crimea to Russia and was involved in its construction. The applicant does not deny having controlled that company from 2012 to 5 August 2014, but states that his shares were sold in particular to his father, through the company Milasi, and were thereafter resold. He states that, in 2019, the sole shareholder of that company was JSC Stroyinvestholding, which was restructured and renamed ‘JSC Stroygazmontazh’ in September 2020, before joining the Gazprom group in 2021. The applicant maintains that, when the contested acts were adopted, he no longer held any shares in SGM, which was put into liquidation on 28 April 2022.

107    In its written pleadings, the Council does not dispute that, when the contested acts were adopted, the applicant’s shares in SGM had been sold. However, according to the Council, the applicant’s wealth derives from the remuneration received from the positions he held in the companies that had entered into state contracts, so that he thus continues to benefit from the Government of the Russian Federation.

108    In addition, the Council contends that the sale of the shares held by the applicant in Gazprom Drilling and SGM does not mean that he does not continue to benefit from them, since he could have transferred his shares to offshore companies.

109    It follows from all of the foregoing that the grounds of the contested acts based on the applicant’s status as former owner of Gazprom Drilling and former co-owner of SGM, which do not rely on information contemporaneous to the contested acts, cannot be regarded as being of such a nature as to justify, by themselves, the finding that the applicant is benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation.

110    However, as the Council points out, according to the case-law, the fact that the grounds for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue refer to conduct which occurred before the date of adoption of the contested acts and which had ended prior to that date does not necessarily mean that the restrictive measures maintained against him by those acts are obsolete. Such a reference cannot, as a matter of principle, be regarded as irrelevant solely because certain actions belong to the more or less distant past (see judgment of 7 June 2023, Shakutin v Council, T‑141/21, not published, EU:T:2023:303, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited).

111    In the light of all the relevant circumstances of the present case, the evidence submitted by the Council concerning Gazprom Drilling and SGM, referred to in paragraphs 104 to 108 above, confirmed and corroborated by ‘the Rotenberg files’ referred to in paragraph 130 below, is such as to disclose, as prima facie evidence, the existence of a modus operandi on the part of the applicant whereby he acquires an undertaking, increases its value through the award of public contracts, and then sells his shares in the relevant companies. Thus, those factors may be taken into account in order to establish continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 100 above.

 The Platon system and RTITS

112    It is necessary to examine the merits of the grounds of the contested acts relating to the applicant’s status as shareholder and then as former shareholder of the Platon system within the framework of RTITS.

113    The information before the Court shows that RTITS is a company which manages an electronic toll collection system capable of tracking lorries on federal highways in Russia and invoicing them for the tolls due under the Platon weight payment system.

114    The applicant confirms that RTITS manages the Platon electronic toll collection system and states, in that regard, that RTITS and the Russian Federation, represented by Rosavtodor (Federal Highways Agency, Russia), entered into a concession agreement on 29 September 2014, in accordance with Order No 1662-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 29 August 2014, for a total duration of 13 years as from the date of signature, with a base fee, pursuant to the concession agreement, of RUB 10 610 million (approximately EUR 116 million) (excluding value added tax) per year. The applicant also confirms that RTITS created and operates the toll collection system at its own expense using the financing received, and transfers all collected funds to the federal budget on a daily basis. The funds collected are channelled into the Federal Highway Fund of the Russian Federation, the source of the highway funds being, in particular, toll payments, it being made clear that those toll payments managed by the Platon system are not taxes but are intended to offset the costs associated with repairing public federal highways. In support of those assertions, the applicant relies on an article published in 2015 in the magazine Vedomosti and on an article published in 2017 on the website ‘Forbes.ru’ to explain that the RUB 10.6 billion (approximately EUR 108 million) received annually during the period from 15 November 2015 to 29 September 2027 for the management of the Platon system enable the company to cover, inter alia, operating expenses, credit costs and agreements with suppliers. According to the financial results for 2015, RTITS spent RUB 473 million (approximately EUR 5.17 million) on management costs and suffered a loss of RUB 621 million (approximately EUR 6.79 million) on account of financial and economic activities.

115    It follows from evidence file 3 and it is confirmed by the applicant that the concession agreement in favour of RTITS was concluded on the basis of Order No 1662-r of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Platon system managed by RTITS was, moreover, financed by a loan from the state-owned bank Gazprombank and, as is also apparent from the annexes to the legal opinion of 24 October 2024, commissioned by the applicant, concerning the sale of the shares in RTITS on 26 December 2023, the applicant’s holding was pledged to Gazprom.

116    Moreover, in its judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council (T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 96), the Court found that RTITS had been awarded, without a call for tenders, the management of the Platon electronic toll system, which the applicant confirmed at the hearing.

117    It must be held that the conclusion of the concession agreement in favour of RTITS, which generates substantial profits, without a call for tenders, amounts to benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f).

118    It should also be observed in that regard that the concession awarded to RTITS, which operates the Platon system, runs until 2027.

119    Furthermore, the existence of that benefit is borne out by the fact that the applicant received from the State budget an exceptionally large share of the RUB 10.6 billion (approximately EUR 108 million) paid to one of his companies during the period from 15 November 2015 to 29 September 2027, a proportion of which is indexed to inflation, over and above all the other financial advantages granted to his other companies.

120    That said, it should be noted that the applicant states that, in 2018, he held only 23.5% of the shares in RTITS, which is also apparent from the information before the Court, and that he subsequently disposed of his holding in that company on 26 December 2023, by selling his shares. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the sale of the shares by the applicant amounts to a change in his specific situation such as to demonstrate that he ceased to benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f).

121    As regards the March 2024 acts, it must be stated that the grounds refer to the applicant as a ‘shareholder’, even though that was no longer the case, and that it was only in the grounds of the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts that the Council amended that reference to ‘former shareholder’, to reflect that sale. However, with respect to the March 2024 acts, it is apparent from all the grounds concerning the applicant that the Council bases the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue also on the fact that, due to ‘his past and current positions’, the applicant ‘continues’ to benefit from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the benefit subsisted on the date of adoption of the contested acts.

122    In that regard, in the first place, it should be observed that the applicant’s 23.5% shareholding in RTITS provided him with a not insignificant, even considerable, annual return, estimated at more than EUR 7 million for the period from 2017 to 2020.

123    In the second place, it should be borne in mind that, as the Council pointed out, the applicant’s shares in RTITS were sold on 26 December 2023, that is to say, approximately three months before the adoption of the March 2024 acts, and that the applicant notified the Council of that sale on 7 February 2024, just over a month before the adoption of the March 2024 acts. In those circumstances, past membership of that entity is not a sufficiently outdated fact as to be excluded (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2023, Shakutin v Council, T‑141/21, not published, EU:T:2023:303, paragraph 207). In addition, account should be taken of the nature of the sale transaction at issue and the time which elapsed between that sale and the adoption of the March 2024 acts in order to examine whether the information was forwarded to the Council in sufficient time to enable it to check that information (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2024, Shamalov v Council, T‑651/22, not published, EU:T:2024:576, paragraph 134).

124    In the third place, the applicant’s modus operandi, and in particular his practice of habitually reinvesting the proceeds of previous sales in other companies and of concealing his status as the legal owner of property and companies in order to keep his assets hidden, supports the Council’s argument that he continues to benefit from his status as former shareholder of RTITS. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant’s status as former shareholder of RTITS and his other previous positions are part of a continuum between, on the one hand, his previous situation and, on the other hand, his current situation, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 100 above, which substantiates the ground that the applicant continues to benefit from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation.

125    In particular, as is apparent from ‘the Rotenberg Files’, the Rotenberg family took various steps to protect its assets from the effects of the restrictive measures while continuing to benefit from them.

126    The applicant denies that the Council is entitled to rely on those documents. In that regard, the Council has not demonstrated that those documents were available to it when the March 2024 acts were adopted. Thus, the Council cannot rely on that material to establish that the facts alleged in the statement of reasons are made out (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

127    Nevertheless, that does not preclude the possibility for the Court to take into account, in its review of the legality of acts imposing restrictive measures, additional evidence which was not in the evidence file relating to the person concerned and which is produced, at the litigation stage, for the purpose of confirming that the facts alleged in the grounds for listing relied on against that person are made out, as long as, first, that evidence corroborates material which was available to the Council at the time of the adoption of the acts in question and, secondly, that evidence relates to facts which pre-date that adoption (judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council, T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 104).

128    Consequently, it must be found that the documents entitled ‘the Rotenberg files’ corroborate the information contained, inter alia, in exhibit 12 of evidence file 5, which shows that, due to Western sanctions, Arkady Rotenberg transferred a large proportion of his assets to his son, the applicant, as part of the family business management network.

129    On the other hand, it must be stated that the Council was fully entitled to maintain that the documents contained in ‘the Rotenberg files’ were available to it when it adopted the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts, since those documents were annexed to the defence lodged by the Council on 20 August 2024.

130    It is apparent from those reports that, since 2014, the Rotenberg family has implemented a series of corporate restructurings and asset transfers, and has transferred assets to special investment vehicles, to proxies and to other family members, which is also corroborated by other evidence produced by the Council. Those reports demonstrate the existence of a systematic practice in that regard, providing an illustration of the modus operandi, particularly of the applicant, of having recourse to schemes in order to continue to control his assets and to benefit from them by circumventing the restrictive measures to which he is subject.

131    Thus, in the light of all those considerations, it must be held that, also because of the wealth he amassed within the framework of the concession obtained by RTITS, the benefit previously secured subsists, despite the transfer of the applicant’s shares in RTITS.

132    In the fourth place, it should also be held that, since the substantial sums accruing to the applicant in return for the sale of his shares amounts to a substitution of the profit derived from ownership of the shares in question, the applicant retained the benefit which he secured through the grant of the concession to RTITS, which will run until 2027, with the result that the consequences of that benefit subsisted on the dates of the contested acts.

133    In that regard, it should be recalled that it is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 95 above that the concept of ‘benefit’, for the purposes of criteria (d) and (f), is to be construed as a profit of any kind. Thus, the concept of ‘benefit’ and the issue of its scope must be interpreted in the light of the particulars of the case, having regard to the situation in Ukraine and the objectives pursued by the contested acts, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine.

134    Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, the Council was fully entitled to consider that that benefit subsisted, at least for a certain period after the sale of the shares in RTITS and, in particular, for as long as the consequences of the applicant’s status as shareholder of RTITS subsisted, when the contested acts were adopted.

135    In that regard, it should be observed that it follows from Annex C.8 to the reply, dated 22 October 2024, containing a witness statement made by the purchaser before a notary, that the price of the transfer of the applicant’s shares is a considerable one, namely RUB 2 billion (approximately EUR 22 million). Accordingly, such a sum obtained by the applicant replaces, at least in part, the benefit which he would have derived from operating the Platon system until 2027. It also follows from that document that the purchaser had already paid RUB 870 million (approximately EUR 9.49 million), that the date of full settlement was scheduled for December 2024 and that the purchaser declared his intention to conclude the settlement on the due date. Although that information is not complete, it shows that, despite the scheduled date, on the date of the March 2024 acts, the September 2024 acts and the March 2025 acts, the applicant continued to receive payment of significant instalments of the sale price.

136    Thus, such a sum, which continues to be paid even after the date of the contested acts, takes account, at least in part, of the benefit that the applicant would have received from operating the Platon system until 2027, which the Council may take into consideration for the purpose of applying criteria (d) and (f). That conclusion is borne out by the applicant’s modus operandi, described in paragraphs 111 and 130 above, of having recourse to strategies whereby he acquires a company, increases its value and later sells it in order to increase his wealth, continue to control his assets and thus continue to benefit from Russian decision-makers and from the Government of the Russian Federation.

137    Therefore, it must be held that the applicant continued to benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation on the dates of the contested acts and thus fulfils listing criteria (d) and (f).

138    Such a conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the facts set out in the grounds for listing were exclusively concerned with earlier facts and no longer reflected his situation on the dates of the contested acts.

139    According to the case-law, the fact that the grounds for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue refer to conduct which occurred before the date of adoption of the contested act and which had ended as at that date does not necessarily mean that the restrictive measures maintained against him by that act are obsolete. For the purpose of establishing that the applicant derives a benefit, such a reference cannot, as a matter of principle, be regarded as irrelevant solely because certain actions belong to the more or less distant past (see judgment of 7 June 2023, Shakutin v Council, T‑141/21, not published, EU:T:2023:303, paragraph 163 and the case-law cited).

140    In addition, it has already been held that the mere fact that, not long before the adoption of the contested acts, the applicant held certain positions may constitute sufficient evidence of his or her personal involvement in or, at the very least, of his or her active support for actions or policies threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in the sense that, even though he or she no longer held any public position when the contested acts were adopted, his or her ties to the persons implementing such actions subsisted (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 88).

141    Furthermore, it follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 100 above that it is possible for the Council to take into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as criterion (d), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the grounds underpinning that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue, by establishing, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation. The same is true of criterion (f).

142    In the light of the foregoing, the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of criteria (d) and (f) must be found to be justified to the requisite legal standard.

143    Therefore, it is not necessary to examine whether the reasons put forward by the Council as regards the association criterion are well founded. According to the case-law, having regard to the preventive nature of decisions adopting restrictive measures, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). The same is true of decisions prolonging the application of restrictive measures.

144    Consequently, the third plea in law must be rejected.

 The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights, in particular his freedom to conduct a business and his right to property, and breach of the principle of proportionality

145    The applicant maintains that the objective of the restrictive measures is to sanction those who threaten or at least support those who threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine. He does not, however, do so and the restrictive measures taken against him are therefore disproportionate in his case. Furthermore, it is neither reasonable nor proportionate to impose personal restrictions on him on the basis of his family ties with his father. The applicant also alleges breach of his right to property and his freedom to conduct a business.

146    The Council disputes those arguments.

147    It should be noted that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is referred to in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law must be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133).

148    Furthermore, the right to property is one of the general principles of EU law (judgment of 2 December 2020, Kalai v Council, T‑178/19, not published, EU:T:2020:580, paragraph 167) and is enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. Similarly, under Article 16 of the Charter, ‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised’.

149    In the present case, it should be observed that the restrictive measures contained in the contested acts entail limitations on the applicant’s exercise of his right to property and his freedom to conduct a business.

150    However, the fundamental rights on which the applicant relies are not absolute and their exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union, provided that such restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very essence of the rights guaranteed (judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 148, and of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council, C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 80).

151    In order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the fundamental rights at issue must be provided for by law, must respect the essential content of those rights, must pursue an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and must not be disproportionate (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraphs 192 and 194 and the case-law cited).

152    It is clear that those four conditions are satisfied in the present case.

153    First, the limitations on the applicant’s exercise of his right to property and his freedom to conduct a business are ‘provided for by law’, since they are laid down in acts which, in particular, are of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and they have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively.

154    Secondly, since the contested acts apply for six months and are to be kept under constant review, as provided for in Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, the limitations referred to in paragraph 153 above are temporary and reversible. Therefore, it must be held that they do not infringe the essential content of the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business.

155    Thirdly, the limitations referred to in paragraph 153 above pursue the objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they put an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine, which is an objective of general interest that falls within the objectives pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU, such as the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security and the protection of civilian populations (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 176).

156    In that regard, it must be pointed out that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the restrictive measures at issue are not aimed solely at those who threaten or who support those who threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, which is not the criterion applied to the applicant, but are also aimed at those who benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Russian Government. There is a rational connection between, on the one hand, targeting persons who benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation and, on the other hand, the objective of the restrictive measures in the present case, which is to increase pressure on the Russian Federation and the costs of actions to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

157    Fourthly, it is necessary to determine whether the limitations at issue are proportionate to the aim pursued.

158    First of all, as regards the appropriateness of those limitations, it should be observed that they are such as to enable the attainment of the objective of general interest referred to in paragraph 155 above, in that they contribute to its achievement. Next, as regards whether they are necessary, it should be pointed out that less restrictive alternative measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, are not as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, namely the application of pressure on the Russian regime and its supporters, having regard in particular to the possibility of circumventing the restrictions imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 182 and the case-law cited).

159    Finally, a weighing up of the interests at stake shows that the disadvantages entailed by the temporary freezing of funds are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued. The importance of the objectives pursued by the contested acts, which form part of the broader objective of maintaining peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU, is such as to outweigh any negative consequences, even considerable ones, for certain operators. In addition, the contested acts provide for the possibility of granting derogations from the restrictive measures applied. In particular, with regard to the freezing of funds, Article 2(3) and (4) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and Article 4(1), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, provide for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources.

160    In that connection, in so far as concerns the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant, it is true that his right to property and his freedom to conduct a business are restricted by the contested acts. However, the inconvenience caused to the applicant is not disproportionate to the importance of the objective pursued by the contested acts. Those acts in fact provide for the periodic review of inclusion on the lists at issue with a view to ensuring that the names of persons and entities that no longer meet the criteria for inclusion on those lists are removed. It should also be pointed out that the contested acts make provision for the possibility of authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to meet certain commitments, and of granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources (judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council, T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 112).

161    Furthermore, that finding as to the absence of breach of the principle of proportionality is not invalidated by the applicant’s argument alleging that the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’, within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f), makes it possible to impose restrictive measures on persons solely because they are active in tendering procedures in the Russian Federation and thus obtain ordinary benefits not linked to the war in Ukraine. It is true, as recalled in paragraph 54 above, that the mere fact of being successful in one or several calls for tender is not sufficient for it to be concluded that there are links enabling the person concerned to benefit from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of the applicable criteria. However, the view must be taken that the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of criteria (d) and (f) may cover persons active in tendering procedures.

162    Consequently, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the interpretation of the concept of ‘benefitting from Russian decision-makers or from the Government of the Russian Federation’, which covers, inter alia, persons who, like the applicant, are active in tendering procedures and who have been awarded a concession agreement without a call for tenders, such as to confer a substantial benefit, goes beyond what is necessary in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert pressure on the Russian authorities so that they bring an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine.

163    It follows that the contested acts did not infringe the principle of proportionality or disproportionately interfere with the applicant’s right to property and his freedom to conduct a business.

164    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth plea in law must be rejected and the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

165    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Mr Igor Rotenberg to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 December 2025.