Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 10 December 2025

Uitspraak

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

10 December 2025 (^*)

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark V4 Financial Partners – Earlier national figurative mark V4 – Relative ground for invalidity – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑274/24,

V4 Holding, a.s., established in Čadca (Slovakia), represented by M. Michalec, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by R. Raponi, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

V4 Financial Partners, SA, established in Madrid (Spain),

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, G. Steinfatt (Rapporteur) and R. Meyer, Judges,

Registrar: J. Cubon, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 8 September 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, V4 Holding, a.s., seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 March 2024 (Case R 2202/2022‑4) (‘the contested decision’).

 Background to the dispute

2        On 28 September 2020, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity in respect of the EU trade mark that had been registered following an application filed on 3 January 2017 in respect of the following figurative sign:

3        The services covered by the contested mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Classes 35 and 36 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 35: ‘Advisory services for business management; business appraisal; business brokerage relating to putting potential private investors into contact with businesspersons needing funding; business management consulting; negotiation and conclusion of commercial transactions for third parties; business consultancy (professional -); acquisitions (advice relating to -); business acquisitions consultation; advice relating to the sale of businesses; advisory services for business management; business merger consultation; business appraisals and evaluations in business matters; consultancy services regarding business strategies; business strategic advisory services; development of marketing strategies and concepts’;

–        Class 36: ‘Debt advisory services; financial consulting; financial analysis; consultancy services relating to corporate finance; financial investment advisory services; financial advisory services; financial appraisal services; arranging the provision of finance; business appraisals for financial valuation; raising of financial capital; financial investment advisory services; consultancy relating to corporate finance and financial investments; financing services for companies; financial advice and consultancy services; debt restructuring; securities services relating to capital restructuring; financial appraisals and valuations; providing of information, consultancy and advice in the field of financial securities; consultancy relating to financial strategy’.

4        The request for a declaration of invalidity was based on the following earlier rights:

–        the Slovak figurative mark reproduced below, filed on 5 February 2009 and registered on 17 August 2009 under No 225 759, covering services in Classes 35 and 36 and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 35: ‘Advertising services; business management; business organisation; business administration; office functions’;

–        Class 36: ‘Insurance; financial services; finance management; services in the field of real estate’:

–        the non-registered word sign V4, used in the course of trade in Slovakia.

5        The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those referred to in Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) thereof, and those referred to in Article 60(1)(c) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 8(4) thereof.

6        On 27 September 2022, the Cancellation Division upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety on the basis of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) thereof, limiting its analysis, for reasons of procedural economy, to the earlier Slovak figurative mark.

7        On 14 November 2022, V4 Financial Partners, SA filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

8        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal and remitted the case to the Cancellation Division.

 Forms of order sought

9        The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order EUIPO to pay the costs.

10      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

 Law

 Admissibility of the action

11      EUIPO contends that there are doubts as to the independence of the applicant’s lawyer, as required by the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. According to the file relating to the administrative proceedings before EUIPO and the website of the law firm V4 Legal, s.r.o., the applicant’s lawyer works for that firm, which in turn belongs to the V4 Group, and therefore to the applicant. In EUIPO’s view, it appears that the applicant’s lawyer has either an employment relationship or is bound by another contract with a law firm which is part of the applicant’s group of companies.

12      The applicant, for its part, maintains that there is no connection between it and its representative other than the standard relationship between a lawyer and his or her client. When requested by the Court to submit its observations in the light, in particular, of the fact that some of the contact details of the applicant, its lawyer, the V4 Group and the law firm V4 Legal, such as postal and electronic addresses and telephone numbers, coincide, the applicant states that those coincidences result purely from marketing considerations and that that lawyer also uses other contact details. Furthermore, that lawyer is an independent practitioner, registered as such at the Slovak Bar Association and is not an employee of the law firm V4 Legal, which would not be possible under the Slovak Act on Advocacy. Lastly, the applicant is a third legal entity in relation to both the law firm V4 Legal and the lawyer in question.

13      The third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court in accordance with Article 53 of that statute, lay down two separate and cumulative conditions as regards the representation before the Courts of the European Union of parties not covered by the first and second paragraphs of Article 19, known as ‘non-privileged’ parties. Under the first condition, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19, those parties must be ‘represented by a lawyer’. Under the second condition, laid down in the fourth paragraph of that article, only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement may represent or assist a party before the Courts of the European Union.

14      The first cumulative condition, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which consists in the obligation for non-privileged parties to be ‘represented by a lawyer’, requires compliance with two requirements. First, that condition imposes on non-privileged parties a prohibition on ‘self-representation’ before the Courts of the European Union, that is to say, those parties may not under any circumstances represent themselves. Secondly, that condition requires the representatives of non-privileged parties to comply with a requirement of independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraphs 58, 59 and 61).

15      As regards the requirement of independence, it is determined both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is determined by the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the representative appointed by a party and that party. Positively, that requirement refers to professional rules and codes of conduct (see judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

16      In addition, the requirement of independence is to be understood not as the lack of any connection whatsoever between the representative appointed by a party and that party, but only the lack of connections which have a manifestly detrimental effect on the representative’s capacity to carry out the task of representation required of him or her with complete independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

17      Any lawyer, irrespective of the form in which he or she practices his or her profession, authorised by the applicable laws, professional rules and codes of conduct, is presumed to satisfy the requirement of independence arising from the first cumulative condition laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 64).

18      Nonetheless, the requirement of independence, imposed on the representatives of non-privileged parties in the specific context of the foregoing provision, necessarily presupposes the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the party and the representative whom it has instructed. Consequently, the presumption of independence referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment does not apply where there is such an employment relationship (judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 65).

19      Other than in cases where there is an employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination between the party and the representative whom it has instructed, that presumption of independence applies and may be rebutted only where it is apparent from specific evidence that there are connections between the party and the representative which have a manifestly detrimental effect on that representative’s capacity to carry out his or her task by acting in his or her client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, or that that representative does not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable (see judgment of 4 September 2025, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO, C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2025:644, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

20      In the present case, it is not apparent from the file, in particular from the evidence referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 above, that there is an employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the applicant and the representative whom it has instructed.

21      Moreover, there is nothing in the file that makes it possible to establish any connections between the law firm V4 Legal and the applicant’s representative that have a manifestly detrimental effect on the latter’s capacity to carry out his task of representation. Similarly, there is nothing in the file to suggest that the applicant’s representative does not comply with the applicable national professional rules and codes of conduct. It follows that the presumption of independence, as recalled in paragraph 19 above, applies.

22      Accordingly, EUIPO’s argument concerning the alleged lack of independence of the applicant’s representative must be rejected.

 Substance

23      The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

24      That single plea is divided into four parts, alleging, in essence, first, an incorrect assessment of the relevant public, secondly, an incorrect comparison of the signs at issue, thirdly, an error in the assessment of the distinctive character of the earlier mark and, fourthly, an error in the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

 The relevant public

25      In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

26      In paragraph 29 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, first, that the services at issue, which referred to the commercial and financial field, were aimed at both the general public and the professional public and, secondly, that the level of attention was relatively high given that those services concerned consumers’ economic and financial assets and therefore had a certain economic importance for the public. In paragraph 30 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the relevant territory is that of Slovakia.

27      The applicant submits that the level of attention of the relevant public varies, depending on specific services, from average to relatively high. As regards the assessment of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the section of the public that has the lowest level of attention should be taken into consideration. For example, certain business management and administration services, or office functions, which do not concern economic or financial assets per se, might not be linked to a higher-than-average level of attention.

28      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. EUIPO considers that the level of attention of the relevant public is relatively high for the services in Classes 35 and 36. First, the financial and banking services covered by Class 36 have economic importance for consumers, since they consist of services that are related to their financial and economic assets. Secondly, as regards the services covered by Class 35, EUIPO states, on the one hand, that the contested mark does not cover office functions and, on the other hand, that the services at issue as covered by the earlier mark are merely business management services. A higher level of attention is all the more justified in so far as economic and financial assets are at issue.

29      In the first place, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find, without being contradicted by the applicant, that the relevant territory for assessing the likelihood of confusion was that of Slovakia.

30      In the second place, it is common ground that the services at issue are aimed at both the general public and a professional public.

31      It is clear from the case-law that the level of attention of the specialised public and of the general public for ‘financial services’ in Class 36 is high since they are liable to have a direct impact on the economic and financial assets of consumers, that they generally involve substantial sums of money and that they may have a significant financial impact (see judgment of 2 March 2022, Banco de Investimento Global v EUIPO – Banco BIC Português (EUROBIC), T‑125/21, not published, EU:T:2022:102, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

32      In addition, it is clear from the case-law that, as regards financial, insurance and real-estate services that are services that consumers do not use on a daily basis, or even frequently, their attention is necessarily greater than that which they display with regard to everyday consumer services. Consequently, the relevant public must be regarded as a broad public with a high level of attention (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 September 2008, FVB v OHIM-FVD (FVB), T‑10/07, not published, EU:T:2008:380, paragraph 35, and of 11 July 2013, Metropolis Inmobiliarias y Restauraciones v OHIM – MIP Metro (METRO), T‑197/12, not published, EU:T:2013:375, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

33      As regards advertising services, business management services and business administration services in Class 35, first, they are aimed at undertakings across all economic sectors, which amount to a specialist public. Even though the services might be considered to be equally aimed at individual entrepreneurs, those too can be regarded as professionals and therefore as forming part of a specialist public. Secondly, it is clear from the case-law that the relevant public displays a high level of attention with regard to those services (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 March 2015, Intermark v OHIM – Coca-Cola (RIENERGY Cola), T‑384/13, not published, EU:T:2015:158, paragraph 31; of 20 July 2016, Internet Consulting v EUIPO – Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige (SUEDTIROL), T‑11/15, EU:T:2016:422, paragraph 36; and of 13 December 2016, Apax Partners v EUIPO – Apax Partners Midmarket (APAX), T‑58/16, not published, EU:T:2016:724, paragraph 27).

34      Lastly, as regards the fact noted by the applicant, even if it were established, that certain office functions might not be connected to a higher-than-average level of attention, it must be noted, as observed by EUIPO, that the contested mark does not cover ‘office functions’.

35      It follows that the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding, in paragraph 29 of the contested decision, that the level of attention of the relevant public was high with regard to all the services at issue.

 The comparison of the services at issue

36      As regards the services at issue in Class 35, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 37 of the contested decision, that ‘advisory services for business management’, ‘consultancy services regarding business strategies’, ‘business strategic advisory services’ and services relating to ‘business appraisal’, ‘business management consulting’, ‘business consultancy (professional -)’, ‘acquisitions (advice relating to -)’, ‘business acquisitions consultation’, ‘advice relating to the sale of businesses’, ‘business merger consultation’ and ‘business appraisals and evaluations in business matters’, covered by the contested mark, were included in the broad category of ‘business management’ services covered by the earlier mark, with the result that they were identical. Furthermore, in paragraph 38 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the ‘business brokerage relating to putting potential private investors into contact with businesspersons needing funding’ and ‘negotiation and conclusion of commercial transactions for third parties’ services covered by the contested mark were similar at least to an average degree to the ‘business management’ services covered by the earlier mark. Lastly, in paragraph 39 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that there was an average degree of similarity between the ‘business management’ services covered by the earlier mark and the ‘development of marketing strategies and concepts’ services covered by the contested mark.

37      In paragraph 40 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the services in Class 36 covered by the contested mark were included in the broad category of ‘financial services’ covered by the earlier mark, with the result that they were identical.

38      There is no need to call into question those assessments of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.

 The comparison of the signs at issue

39      In paragraph 45 of the contested decision, first, the Board of Appeal held that the contested sign was composed of the word element ‘v’ followed by a figurative device and that the majority of the relevant public would not be able to recognise that element as the number 4 due to its strong stylisation and its configuration of four vertical stripes of different lengths. Secondly, the Board of Appeal added that the remaining part of the relevant public might perceive that figurative element as a highly stylised number 4, the vertical stripes of the figurative element being arranged and sized in such a way that the common outline of the number 4 might be recognisable by a part of the relevant public.

40      According to the applicant, it is, on the contrary, a majority of the relevant public that will clearly recognise the number 4 in the contested mark.

41      The Board of Appeal took into account, in its assessment, the part of the relevant public that will perceive the figurative element of the contested mark as a representation of the number 4. In paragraph 47 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that it would take into account both the part of the relevant public that would perceive that figurative element as representing the number 4 and the part of the relevant public that would not perceive it in that way. That argument must therefore be rejected as ineffective.

–       The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue

42      In paragraph 48 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the distinctive character of the common element ‘v4’ was weak, on the ground that, in so far as it will be recognised by the relevant public in the contested sign, it will be associated by that public with the Visegrád group, also known as the ‘Visegrád Four’, ‘V4’ being an informal abbreviation for that group. In the context of the relevant services, the Board of Appeal found that the element ‘v4’ provided descriptive information about the geographical origin, namely that the services at issue were provided in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

43      First, the applicant disputes that the element ‘v4’ is frequently used in the media and public debate in Slovakia, such that it would be associated with an indication of geographical origin by the relevant public. The Visegrád group is also known as the ‘Visegrád Four’ and if the element ‘v4’ were used in that context, it would basically amount to an abbreviation of an abbreviation. According to the applicant, even if the relevant public were to recognise ‘V4’ as an informal abbreviation designating the countries of the Visegrád group, it would not automatically follow that that term may serve, in trade, to designate geographical origin. Furthermore, since the Visegrád group is an informal intergovernmental grouping, it cannot render any of the services concerned and has no connection with them in general.

44      Secondly, the applicant states that EUIPO has not established that the relevant public associated the element ‘v4’ with the ‘Visegrád group’ countries already at the date on which the application for registration of the contested mark was filed or that that element could be seen as an indication of the geographical origin of the relevant services already at that point in time.

45      Thirdly, the applicant considers that the Board of Appeal was required to state reasons for its decision in respect of each of the services. No distinction was made between the services in Classes 35 and 36. Similarly, no explanation was given as to why the relevant services in those classes were grouped together for the purposes of assessing the distinctive character of the element ‘v4’.

46      Fourthly, the applicant states that it is highly unlikely that the relevant public would refer to the contested mark other than by ‘V4’ or ‘V4 Financial Partners’. A weak distinctive character of an element of a composite mark does not necessarily imply that that element cannot constitute a dominant element, since it may make an impression on consumers and be remembered by them.

47      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

48      EUIPO submits that, as regards the inherent distinctive character of the element ‘v4’, the Board of Appeal correctly found that that distinctive character was weak given that it had a clear and direct meaning in relation to the services at issue.

49      First, EUIPO considers that the Visegrád group and the denomination ‘V4’ are likely to be known to the relevant public involved in the sector of business and financial services. Furthermore, the applicant acknowledged before the Board of Appeal the use of the abbreviation ‘V4’ in the media and public debate in Slovakia. Similarly, it is apparent from the applicant’s company profile in English that that abbreviation had been used to denote the Visegrád group.

50      Secondly, EUIPO observes that, in the field of financial services, a place name or a reference to it in abbreviated form, as in the present case, is normally used and understood as a reference to the principal place of business of the undertaking supplying the services at issue and, therefore, to the place from which they are generally supplied. That fact is sufficient to designate a characteristic of the services at issue, making that element descriptive. In the present case, there is no doubt that the element ‘v4’ evokes the geographical territory of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

51      Thirdly, EUIPO notes that the Board of Appeal was not obliged to establish that the relevant public associated the element ‘v4’ with the Visegrád group countries at the date of filing of the application for registration of the earlier mark, since the inherent distinctive character of the components of the signs should be assessed at the time of the decision. In any event, EUIPO observes that the Board of Appeal simply held that the element ‘v4’ was weakly distinctive for all of the services at issue, not that it was completely devoid of any distinctive character due to its descriptiveness.

52      According to the case-law, in assessing the dominant character of one or more given components of a composite trade mark, account must be taken, in particular, of the intrinsic qualities of each of those components by comparing them with those of the other components. In particular, account may be taken of the size and relative position of the various components within the arrangement of the composite mark (see judgment of 6 November 2024, House of Prince v EUIPO – Biały (AROMA KING), T‑118/23, not published, EU:T:2024:778, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

53      In order to determine the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see judgment of 5 October 2020, Eugène Perma France v EUIPO – SPI Investments Group (NATURANOVE), T‑602/19, not published, EU:T:2020:463, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

54      The weak distinctive character of an element of a composite mark does not necessarily imply that that element cannot constitute a dominant element since it may, on account, in particular, of its position in the sign or its size, make an impression on consumers and be remembered by them (see judgments of 12 November 2008, Weiler v OHIM – IQNet Association – The International Certification Network (Q2WEB), T‑242/07, not published, EU:T:2008:488, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited; of 16 January 2014, Ferienhäuser zum See v OHIM – Sunparks Groep (Sun Park Holidays), T‑383/12, not published, EU:T:2014:12, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited; and of 21 June 2023, Ioulia and Irene Tseti Pharmaceutical Laboratories v EUIPO – Arbora & Ausonia (InterMed Pharmaceutical Laboratories eva intima), T‑197/22 and T‑198/22, not published, EU:T:2023:345, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

55      Similarly, it is necessary to examine whether other elements of those signs appear likely to make an impression on the public and to be remembered by it (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2010, Companhia Muller de Bebidas v OHIM – Missiato Industria e Comercio (61 A NOSSA ALEGRIA), T‑472/08, EU:T:2010:347, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

56      In the first place, as regards the earlier mark, it should be noted at the outset that it consists of only one word element, namely ‘v4’, depicted in a standard white font, and of two rectangular blue figurative elements, each superimposed on another rectangular blue shape.

57      According to settled case-law, where a trade mark is composed of both verbal and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more readily refer to the goods in question by quoting their name than by describing the figurative element of the trade mark (see judgments of 9 September 2008, Honda Motor Europe v OHIM – Seat (MAGIC SEAT), T‑363/06, EU:T:2008:319, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited, and of 5 March 2025, People Against Dirty v EUIPO – Ningbo Future Houseware (ecovie), T‑278/24, not published, EU:T:2025:212, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

58      Furthermore, in the present case, the rectangular shape will not be remembered as such by the relevant public, since it is a basic geometric shape.

59      Moreover, the two simple rectangular shapes serve only to frame the letter ‘v’ and the number 4, each of which is placed in rectangular figurative elements. Those figurative elements will be perceived as purely decorative and as seeking to focus the attention of the relevant public on the word element ‘v4’.

60      Consequently, irrespective of whether the element ‘v4’ has, with regard to the relevant public in question, a weak distinctive character on account of an evocative, allusive or even descriptive character as regards the services at issue, that element, which constitutes the only word element of the earlier mark, is, in any event, likely to make an impression on the relevant public and be remembered by that public, with the result that it constitutes the dominant element of the earlier mark.

61      In the second place, as regards the contested mark, it must first of all be noted that, having regard to the fact that the vertical stripes of the figurative element are arranged in such a way that the common outline of the number 4 becomes identifiable, the part of the relevant public that will recognise the number 4 will be at least non-negligible.

62      Next, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraph 49 of the contested decision, the other word element of the contested mark, ‘financial partners’, is non-distinctive, because, depicted in a standard font and considerably smaller than the common word element ‘v4’, it refers to the providers of the services at issue and the nature thereof, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant.

63      Furthermore, the element ‘v4’ occupies a prominent position by comparison with the word element ‘financial partners’, which is located only in the upper corner of the right-hand side of the contested mark.

64      Lastly, the number 4 of the word element ‘v4’ is, on account of its strong stylisation, easy to remember and thus shapes the overall impression of the contested mark.

65      Consequently, the word element ‘v4’ constitutes, also in the contested mark, the dominant element given that it is likely to make an impression on the relevant public and to be remembered by that public, irrespective of whether it is evocative, allusive or even descriptive of the services at issue.

66      It follows that the common word element ‘v4’ constitutes the dominant element in the overall impression created by each of the marks at issue.

–       The visual similarity

67      The applicant submits, in essence, that the signs at issue have a degree of visual similarity that is at least average, or even ‘above average’.

68      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It maintains that the Board of Appeal correctly found that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree.

69      In paragraph 56 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, for the part of the relevant public that would recognise the element ‘v4’, the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree. For the remaining part of the relevant public, the degree of visual similarity is very low.

70      In the present case, the initial part of the contested mark is identical to the only word element of the earlier mark. Similarly, the contested mark comprises the entire word element of the earlier mark, namely ‘v4’. Those similarities will thus be noticed immediately and easily be remembered by the relevant public. The signs at issue differ only, first, in the word element ‘financial partners’ in the contested mark, which is represented in a standard font that is smaller than the common word element ‘v4’ and, secondly, in the figurative elements in the earlier mark and the graphic representation of the number 4 in the contested mark.

71      To the extent that the only word element of the earlier mark is entirely included in the contested mark and since that element constitutes the dominant element in the overall impression created by each of the marks at issue, the difference consisting in the addition of the element ‘financial partners’ at the end of the contested mark is not sufficiently great to cancel out the similarity arising from the coincidence of the element ‘v4’.

72      That perception is, moreover, reinforced by the size and central position of the word element ‘v4’ within the contested mark.

73      In those circumstances, it must be held that, visually, the signs in question are similar not to a low degree, as the Board of Appeal found with regard to at least a non-negligible part of the relevant public, but to an average degree. Thus, the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that, with regard to the part of the relevant public that would recognise the number 4, the signs at issue were visually similar only to a low degree.

–       The phonetic similarity

74      In paragraph 57 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, first, as regards the part of the relevant public that would recognise the number 4 and would pronounce the element ‘v4’ as an alphanumeric sequence, the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a ‘below-average’ degree. Secondly, as regards the remaining part of the relevant public, the Board of Appeal found that there was a very low degree of phonetic similarity.

75      The applicant submits, in essence, that the signs at issue are phonetically similar at least to an ‘above-average’ degree. A mark consisting of several words will generally be abbreviated orally to something easier to pronounce, whereas it is likely that any secondary element will not be pronounced by the relevant public. Furthermore, the fact that the word element of the earlier mark is wholly incorporated in the dominant element of the trade mark applied for justifies the conclusion that there is significant phonetic similarity.

76      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It submits that the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to conclude that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a ‘below-average’ degree.

77      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that although the Board of Appeal classified, as regards the part of the relevant public that will pronounce the element ‘v4’, the degree of phonetic similarity as ‘below average’, it must be understood that it found that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a low degree.

78      It is settled case-law that only the word elements of a composite mark are likely to be pronounced. Furthermore, the average consumer will, on the one hand, tend orally to abbreviate a mark comprising a number of terms in order to make it easier to pronounce and, on the other hand, generally take more note of the beginning of a sign than of its end (see judgment of 24 September 2019, IAK – Forum International v EUIPO – Schwalb (IAK), T‑497/18, not published, EU:T:2019:689, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

79      In the present case, the pronunciation of the contested mark includes the full pronunciation of the earlier mark, namely the dominant element ‘v4’.

80      The incorporation of the only word element of the earlier trade mark in the element that the relevant public will specifically retain in mind from the contested mark justifies the conclusion that there is significant phonetic similarity (see judgment of 30 September 2010, PVS v OHIM – MeDiTA Medizinische Kurierdienst (medidata), T‑270/09, not published, EU:T:2010:419, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

81      Furthermore, in addition to the fact that the dominant element ‘v4’ will be read first, the other word element of the contested mark, ‘financial partners’, which is devoid of any distinctive character, may, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 78 above, not be pronounced by the relevant public.

82      Consequently, it must be held that, for the at least non-negligible part of the relevant public that will pronounce the number 4, the signs at issue are phonetically similar to a high degree.

83      It follows that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that, with regard to that part of the relevant public, the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a low degree.

–       The conceptual similarity

84      In paragraph 58 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, first, as regards the part of the relevant public that would recognise the meaning of the element ‘v4’, the signs at issue were conceptually similar to a low degree. In paragraph 59 of the contested decision, it found that, secondly, as regards the remaining part of the relevant public, the signs at issue conveyed different concepts, with the result that they were not conceptually similar.

85      The applicant submits that even if part of the relevant public considered the element ‘v4’ as referring to the Visegrád group, the signs at issue are conceptually very similar, if not identical. As regards the remaining part of the relevant public, a conceptual comparison is not possible. The Board of Appeal has not in any way explained what the different concepts of the signs at issue might be.

86      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It points out that where a common element is only weakly distinctive, the conceptual similarity between the signs at issue is low.

87      In the first place, the signs at issue differ in the word element ‘financial partners’ in the contested mark. The Board of Appeal correctly found that the concept conveyed by that element was very descriptive, with the result that it cannot create a decisive conceptual difference.

88      In the second place, the common dominant element ‘v4’ is the only word element of the earlier mark, with the result that it plays an important role in the perception of the signs at issue. As the applicant submitted in its observations on the statement setting out the grounds of appeal before the Board of Appeal, the element ‘v4’ refers, notwithstanding the question whether it may be evocative, allusive or even descriptive with regard to the services at issue, to the Visegrád group, an informal grouping aimed at advancing cooperation in various fields, such as economic and cultural affairs, which is mainly used in the media as an abbreviation for the name of that group. Although the element ‘v4’, assuming it is established, is an informal abbreviation, it appears likely to be understood by the relevant public in at least one of its potential meanings. Its common presence produces a conceptual similarity for the part of the relevant public that will recognise its meaning as referring to that informal grouping.

89      Consequently, as regards the at least non-negligible part of the relevant public that will recognise the meaning of the element ‘v4’, the signs at issue are conceptually similar to at least an average degree.

90      It follows that the Board of Appeal’s assessment that, with regard to that part of the relevant public, the signs at issue were conceptually similar to a low degree is flawed.

 The distinctive character of the earlier mark

91      The applicant submits that the evidence submitted justifies the finding of a ‘high degree of enhanced distinctiveness’ of the earlier mark. In particular, the Board of Appeal did not examine the various items of evidence globally and in conjunction with each other, but rather individually and in isolation, or even omitting parts of that evidence from its analysis without any explanation. According to the applicant, had such a comprehensive assessment been conducted, it would have been found that the earlier mark had been used since 2009 to an economically significant extent, considering the particulars of the market concerned, geographically covering all of the eight administrative regions in Slovakia. Moreover, the earlier mark has been used in relation to services provided to various well-known clients, whereas there have been instances of impactful marketing practices, including sponsorship of a top-tier club in a very popular sport or specialised book publication and TV interviews.

92      In any event, the evidence submitted is sufficient, at the very least, to enhance the distinctiveness from a below-average degree to an average degree or from an average degree to an above-average degree. The applicant submits that, in paragraphs 63, 71 and 75 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal adopted an overly restrictive interpretation of the notion of enhanced distinctiveness to the effect that, if proved, it should only lead to a finding of a high distinctive character of the mark in question. In its view, the turnover figures, geographical span of use, or servicing clients of, at the very least, national renown cannot be considered as market standard or average use of the contested mark. The same holds true for marketing activities.

93      Lastly, the applicant submits that the contested decision lacks sufficient reasoning, since the Board of Appeal did not explain why the evidence submitted by the applicant is insufficient to enhance the distinctive character of the earlier trade mark. The finding in paragraph 67 of the contested decision that the aggregate volume of invoices submitted by the applicant were ‘not substantial considering the size of the market concerned’ prevents the applicant from submitting an appropriate defence, since it is not clear in respect of which reference scale the assessment was made. It is not clear whether by ‘the size of the market concerned’ the Board of Appeal meant Slovakia as a whole or the market for business and financial advisory services and, consequently, how it measured what would be considered as a substantial economic volume. Should the Court find otherwise, the applicant wishes to provide evidence to contest the accuracy of that line of argument, which, in its view, seems to be put forward by the Board of Appeal as a well-known fact.

94      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It observes that the evidence submitted by the applicant, even when considered in its entirety, falls short of demonstrating the enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark. First, the applicant cannot rely on plausible presumptions, but should have submitted sufficient and solid evidence. Secondly, the evidence relating to the volume of sales of goods or services bearing the mark, including sales invoices, may be regarded only as secondary evidence that may support, where relevant, direct evidence of distinctive character acquired through use, such as that provided by statements from professional associations or market studies. Sales figures do not demonstrate that the public targeted by the services at issue perceives the earlier mark as an indication of commercial origin. Thirdly, as regards the evidence relating to the sponsorship of the ice hockey team, EUIPO states that that sponsorship lasted for only one season and that the applicant was one of the many sponsors of the club. Similarly, in view of the absence of figures relating to the distribution of the book on transfer pricing, the extract from that book is not relevant. Fourthly, as regards the two items of evidence that appear to be missing from the Board of Appeal’s analysis, EUIPO observes that the Board of Appeal implicitly, yet necessarily, considered that those two items were also insufficient to demonstrate the enhanced distinctive ness of the earlier mark. The Board of Appeal is not required to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the lines of reasoning articulated by the parties before it.

95      In the present case, as has been stated in paragraph 60 above, the word element ‘v4’ constitutes the dominant element of the earlier mark. That dominant element will be understood by the part of the relevant public that will recognise the number 4 as referring to the informal grouping the ‘Visegrád Four’, thus evoking the geographical territory of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Similarly, it is apparent from paragraph 59 above that the figurative elements are perceived as purely decorative and as seeking to focus the attention of the relevant public on the word element ‘v4’.

96      Therefore, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find, in paragraph 73 of the contested decision, that the earlier mark as a whole had a ‘below-average’, that is to say weak, distinctive character.

97      In the present case, there is no need to analyse the possible enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark acquired through intensive use (see paragraphs 112 and 114 below).

 The overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion

98      In paragraph 81 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

99      The applicant argues that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.

100    First, the applicant submits that the fact that a trade mark is of weak distinctive character does not exclude a likelihood of confusion, in particular where the signs and the goods or services are similar. According to the applicant, the most dominant and independent element with a greater distinctive character in both signs is the element ‘v4’, which would be clearly noticed by the majority of the relevant public. In any event, it is not necessary to establish the existence of a likelihood of confusion for the entirety of the relevant public, but it is sufficient that there is a likelihood of confusion for a part of the relevant public, namely, that composed of consumers likely to perceive the signs at issue as the alphanumeric sequence ‘v4’. The figurative elements and the descriptive term ‘financial partners’ would be secondary and barely noticeable.

101    Secondly, the applicant states that the relevant public will not have the chance to see the relevant providers of services next to each other. Moreover, many relevant financial services would not be provided on a daily or weekly basis.

102    EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. It submits that the Board of Appeal was correct in excluding any likelihood of confusion, even for identical services, because the similarities between the signs at issue stem exactly from the weakly distinctive common element ‘v4’. Furthermore, the principle of interdependence does not automatically give rise to a likelihood of confusion where the services in question are identical and there is some degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. That is all the more true in so far as, in the present case, the visual aspect of the signs carries more weight.

103    The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

104    For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

105    A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account, and in particular between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

106    In the present case, first, the level of attention of the relevant public is high with regard to all the services at issue (see paragraph 35 above).

107    Secondly, it is apparent from paragraphs 36 to 38 above that the services at issue are identical or similar to at least an average degree.

108    Thirdly, the signs at issue are visually similar to an average degree (see paragraph 73 above), phonetically similar to a high degree and conceptually similar to at least an average degree (see paragraphs 82 and 89 above).

109    Fourthly, as has been stated in paragraph 96 above, the earlier mark has weak inherent distinctive character.

110    The finding of weak distinctive character for the earlier trade mark does not prevent a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. Although the distinctive character of the earlier mark must be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of confusion, it is only one factor among others involved in that assessment. Thus, even in a case involving an earlier mark of weak distinctive character, there may be a likelihood of confusion on account, in particular, of a similarity between the signs and between the goods or services covered (see judgment of 13 December 2007, Xentral v OHIM – Pages jaunes (PAGESJAUNES.COM), T‑134/06, EU:T:2007:387, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO, C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 55).

111    Conversely, to give priority to the weak distinctive character of a mark in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion would lead to the conclusion that, where a mark has only a weak distinctive character, a likelihood of confusion would exist only where the mark applied for reproduced that mark entirely, whatever the degree of similarity between the marks at issue. Such a result would not, however, be consistent with the very nature of the global assessment that the competent authorities are required to undertake by virtue of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (judgment of 25 April 2018, Perfumes y Aromas Artesanales v EUIPO – Aromas Selective (Aa AROMAS artesanales), T‑426/16, not published, EU:T:2018:223, paragraph 108; see also, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2007, T.I.M.E. ART v OHIM, C‑171/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:171, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

112    In those circumstances, in the present case, although the inherent distinctive character of the earlier mark is weak, the fact remains that the average degree of visual similarity combined with the high degree of phonetic and at least average degree of conceptual similarity of the signs at issue means that the at least non-negligible part of the relevant public that will recognise the number 4 in the contested mark, even if its level of attention is high with regard to all the services at issue, might believe that the services at issue that are identical or similar come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.

113    Thus, it must be held, in accordance with the principle of interdependence referred to in paragraph 103 above, that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of at least a non-negligible part of the relevant public with regard to the signs at issue.

114    Therefore, the single plea in law must be upheld and the contested decision annulled, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the evidence relating to enhanced distinctiveness acquired through use and provided by the applicant in Annexes A.8 and A.9 to the application.

 Costs

115    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

116    Since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 March 2024 (Case R 2202/2022‑4);

2.      Orders EUIPO to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 December 2025.