Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 25 February 2026

Uitspraak

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

25 February 2026 (^*)

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark BRAMANI – Earlier EU word mark BRAHMA – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑298/25,

PFP Monaco, established in Monaco (Monaco), represented by F. Celluprica, F. Fischetti and F. De Bono, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Lobotková and T. Klee, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO being

Stanton SAS, established in Bogota (Colombia),

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of N. Półtorak, President, G. Hesse and D. Petrlík (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, PFP Monaco, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 March 2025 (Case R 1127/2024‑5) (‘the contested decision’).

 Background to the dispute

2        On 5 July 2022, the applicant filed with EUIPO an application for registration of an EU trade mark for the word sign BRAMANI.

3        The trade mark applied for designated goods in Classes 24 and 25 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponding, inter alia, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 24: ‘Textile fabrics in the piece; tissues being textile piece goods; textile fabric piece goods for use in the manufacture of clothing; knitted fabrics of wool yarn; knitted fabrics of silk yarn; knitted fabrics of cotton yarn; textiles; woven fabrics; non-woven textile fabrics; fabric for manufacturing women’s outerwear; fabric for manufacturing men’s outerwear; apparel fabrics; labels of textile; textiles for furnishings; woven furnishing fabrics; soft furnishings; traced cloths for embroidery; fabric for footwear; linings [textile]; lingerie fabric; woven fabrics for furniture; fabrics for textile use; textile piece goods (polyurethane coated -) for making waterproof clothing; textile piece goods for use in the manufacture of protective clothing; textile fabrics for use in the manufacture of sportswear; waterproof fabrics for use in the manufacture of gloves; waterproof textile fabrics; waterproof fabrics for use in the manufacture of jackets; breathable waterproof fabrics; elastic fabrics for clothing’;

–        Class 25: ‘Headgear; nightcaps; sports caps and hats; caps being headwear; visors; shoes; casual footwear; wooden shoes; dress shoes; training shoes; athletic shoes; canvas shoes; dance shoes; beach shoes; leather shoes; flat shoes; pumps [footwear]; running shoes; footwear for men; leisure shoes; high-heeled shoes; rainshoes; deck shoes; walking shoes; hidden heel shoes; ballroom dancing shoes; sandals; footwear not for sports; boots; ski boots; snow boots; half-boots; esparto shoes or sandals; bath sandals; slippers; shoe straps; insoles [for shoes and boots]; clothing; undershirts; sweat shirts; maillots [hosiery]; evening wear; beach clothes; sportswear; formal evening wear; casual jackets; jackets [clothing]; trousers; quilted jackets [clothing]; knit jackets; overcoats; sweaters; denim jeans; cloaks; parkas; casualwear; shawls; foulards [clothing articles]; scarves; formalwear; sundresses; dresses made from skins; imitation leather dresses; dress shirts; casual shirts; shirts; chemises; pantie-girdles; leather belts [clothing]; belts [clothing]; braces [suspenders] for clothing; suits; leisure suits; evening suits; men’s suits; pantsuits; shirts for suits; waistcoats; dance costumes; one-piece suits; bathing suits for men; dress pants; shorts; cravats; silk ties; neckwear; bolo ties with precious metal tips; bowties; overcoats; cardigans; underwear; dressing gowns; dressing gowns; polo shirts; combinations [clothing]; waterproof clothing; leather dresses; linen clothing; woollen clothing; woven clothing; embroidered clothing; shoulder straps for clothing; gabardines [clothing]; roll necks [clothing]; outerclothing for boys; long sleeved vests; clothing of imitations of leather; garments for protecting clothing; shrugs; gloves [clothing]; turtlenecks; turtleneck sweaters; weatherproof clothing; knit tops; inner socks for footwear; socks’.

4        On 30 September 2022, Stanton SAS filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of inter alia the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5        The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark BRAHMA, designating goods in Classes 18 and 25 and corresponding inter alia, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 18: ‘Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; animal skins; trunks and suitcases; rucksacks; umbrellas; parasols; walking sticks; whips, harness and saddlery’;

–        Class 25: ‘Dresses; articles of footwear; headgear’.

6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7        On 2 April 2024, the Opposition Division partially upheld the opposition, refusing registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

8        On 31 May 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision in so far as it refused the application for registration of the mark applied for.

9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion for the Spanish-speaking part of the public in the European Union. If found, first, that the goods at issue were identical or similar to varying degrees. Secondly, it noted that the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree and phonetically similar to an above-average degree, whereas the conceptual comparison was neutral.

 Forms of order sought

10      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision and allow the trade mark application to proceed to registration in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above;

–        order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs, including the costs relating to the proceedings before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal.

11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action in its entirety;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

 Law

12      In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue.

13      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

14      According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. According to the same case-law, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 22 September 2021, Sociedade da Água de Monchique v EUIPO – Ventura Vendrell (chic ÁGUA ALCALINA 9,5 PH), T‑195/20, EU:T:2021:601, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

15      For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the signs at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 September 2021, chic ÁGUA ALCALINA 9,5 PH, T‑195/20, EU:T:2021:601, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

16      Where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods in question in that territory. However, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 January 2025, Drinks Prod v EUIPO – Paul Hartmann (OmniSan), T‑189/24, not published, EU:T:2025:5, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

17      Similarly, it is apparent from the case-law that a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion for a non-negligible part of the relevant public is sufficient to uphold an opposition brought against an application for registration of a mark (see judgment of 6 November 2024, Freddo v EUIPO – Krema (doffre), T‑1091/23, not published, EU:T:2024:788, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

18      The present action must be examined in the light of those principles.

 The relevant public

19      According to the case-law, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 22 September 2021, chic ÁGUA ALCALINA 9,5 PH, T‑195/20, EU:T:2021:601, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

20      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that, although the relevant territory is the entire European Union, it was appropriate to take into account the perspective of the Spanish-speaking public in the European Union. Next, it found that the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’, covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18, were intended for professionals in the field of the manufacture of goods made from leather or imitation leather and who display an above average level of attention. With regard to the other goods in Class 18 covered by the earlier mark and the goods at issue in Class 25, it found that the goods were primarily directed at the general public, whose level of attention is average.

21      As regards the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for and referred to in paragraph 7 above, the Board of Appeal found that part of those goods was intended for a professional public in the textile, fashion or manufacturing sectors with a high level of attention. Those goods corresponded to ‘textile fabric piece goods for use in the manufacture of clothing; knitted fabrics of wool yarn; knitted fabrics of silk yarn; knitted fabrics of cotton yarn; fabric for manufacturing women’s outerwear; fabric for manufacturing men’s outerwear; labels of textile; fabric for footwear; woven fabrics for furniture; textile piece goods (polyurethane coated -) for making waterproof clothing; textile piece goods for use in the manufacture of protective clothing; textile fabrics for use in the manufacture of sportswear; waterproof fabrics for use in the manufacture of gloves; waterproof textile fabrics; waterproof fabrics for use in the manufacture of jackets; breathable waterproof fabrics; elastic fabrics for clothing’.

22      The applicant does not contest the Board of Appeal’s findings referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above.

23      However, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s definition of the relevant public in relation to the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for and not referred to in paragraph 21 above, namely ‘textile fabrics in the piece; tissues being textile piece goods; textiles; woven fabrics; non-woven textile fabrics; apparel fabrics; textiles for furnishings; woven furnishing fabrics; soft furnishings; traced cloths for embroidery; linings [textile]; lingerie fabric; fabrics for textile use’.

24      In that regard, the Board of Appeal found that those goods were intended for both professionals and private individuals, in particular hobbyists and home sewers, the latter purchasing them for personal use, that is to say home projects or non-commercial crafting. According to the Board of Appeal, the degree of attention of those individuals varied from average to above average.

25      The applicant submits that, with regard to the goods in Class 24, the Board of Appeal should have found that the relevant public for the purposes of assessing the likelihood of confusion consisted solely of professionals.

26      Even if the Board of Appeal should have found that the relevant public for the purposes of assessing the likelihood of confusion consisted solely of professionals, that would have no bearing on the legality of the contested decision for the reasons set out in paragraph 95 below.

 The comparison of the goods

27      According to settled case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary (see judgment of 3 September 2025, Eti v EUIPO – Star Foods E.M. (Decoration for bags of packaging), T‑83/24, EU:T:2025:813, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

28      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, first, that the goods in Class 25 covered by the mark applied for were partly identical and partly similar to the goods in the same class covered by the earlier mark. The applicant does not dispute that assessment.

29      As regards, next, the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal considered that they were similar, at least to a low degree, to the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18, since both categories of goods constituted raw materials for the manufacture of finished goods in the fashion and furnishings sectors.

30      The applicant claims that that finding is vitiated by an error of assessment.

31      It submits, first, that the Board of Appeal should have regarded the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark as finished products and not as raw materials. That interpretation follows from the importance of the class headings in the Nice Agreement, which determine the scope of protection conferred by the earlier mark and enable the applicant to assess the scope and limits of that protection when registering a new trade mark. In the present case, the goods covered by the earlier mark are in Class 18, which covers accessories, and not Class 24, which covers inter alia raw materials and fabrics. If the opponent had intended to claim protection for leather and imitations of leather as raw materials, it should have referred, in its application for registration, to Class 24 instead of Class 18.

32      In that regard, it follows, first, from Article 33(7) of Regulation 2017/1001 that goods and services are not to be regarded as being dissimilar from each other on the ground that they appear in different classes under the Nice Classification. That classification is carried out for exclusively administrative purposes and cannot determine, in itself, the nature and characteristics of the goods at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2025, Asaş Alüminyum v EUIPO – Asfaltos del Sureste (ASAŞ), T‑172/24, not published, EU:T:2025:313, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

33      Secondly, the Court has already held that the concept of ‘leather and imitations of leather’ in Class 18 designates those goods as raw materials (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 June 2019, Aldi v EUIPO – Crone (CRONE), T‑385/18, not published, EU:T:2019:449, paragraphs 35 to 37, and of 25 June 2020, Pavel v EUIPO – bugatti (B), T‑114/19, not published, EU:T:2020:286, paragraphs 34 and 35).

34      In the present case, the goods in Class 18 covered by the earlier mark include not only goods made of leather and imitations of leather, but also the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ as such. Thus, the Board of Appeal was right, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the contested decision, to take into account the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ as raw materials.

35      Secondly, the applicant submits that the ‘leather and imitations of leather’ in Class 18 have nothing in common with the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for, such as textiles.

36      In that regard, it is true that those two categories of goods differ in their material composition and, accordingly, in their nature.

37      That said, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for and the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’, as raw materials, are used for the manufacture of finished goods in the fashion and furnishings sectors.

38      In that regard, the Court has also had occasion to clarify that ‘leather and imitations of leather’ in Class 18, on the one hand, and textile goods and fabrics in Class 24, on the other, are raw materials intended for processing, with the result that they are competing and interchangeable and have the same purpose, namely to be used to manufacture a finished or semi-finished product (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2020, Casual Dreams v EUIPO – López Fernández (Dayaday), T‑50/19, not published, EU:T:2020:407, paragraph 130).

39      The same conclusion must be drawn with regard to the other goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for, since they are also raw materials or similar articles intended for processing and thus have a purpose and method of use which are comparable to that of textile goods and fabrics.

40      In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the goods covered by the mark applied for and in Class 24 are similar to the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18, it being understood that the degree of similarity must be regarded as average.

41      That finding is not called into question by the applicant’s arguments.

42      First of all, the applicant cannot maintain that such reasoning amounts to considering that all finished goods made of leather or imitations of leather – such as footwear or sofas – are complementary to the textile goods in Class 24.

43      First, the comparison referred to in paragraph 40 above does not concern finished goods made of leather or imitations of leather in Class 18, but the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ as raw materials.

44      Secondly, it is apparent from the case-law that raw materials and finished goods cannot be regarded as complementary on the ground that one is manufactured with the other. The raw materials subject to a transformation process are essentially different from the finished products which incorporate those raw materials, both by their nature and by their aim and intended purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2017, Dogg Label v EUIPO – Chemoul (JAPRAG), T‑406/16, not published, EU:T:2017:482, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

45      It follows that the fact that the goods in question are interchangeable as raw materials used for the manufacture of finished goods does not permit the inference that all finished goods made of leather or imitations of leather – such as footwear or sofas – are complementary to the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for.

46      Next, the applicant claims that the goods in question differ in terms of their public and intended purpose, since the goods covered by the mark applied for and in Class 24 are used by undertakings for the manufacture of finished goods, whereas the goods covered by the earlier mark in Class 18 are intended for sale to end consumers.

47      Such an argument is again based on the incorrect premiss that the goods in Class 18 covered by the earlier mark include only finished goods. That argument must therefore be rejected for the reasons set out in paragraphs 32 to 34 above.

48      Lastly, the applicant submits that, in any event, the earlier mark may prevent registration of the mark applied for only in respect of fabrics similar to leather and imitations of leather. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the goods covered by the mark applied for and in Class 24 include a large number of fabrics which are identified in particular by their material – such as knitted fabrics of wool yarn and knitted fabrics of silk yarn – or by their intended purpose, such as apparel fabrics and waterproof fabrics for use in the manufacture of gloves. The applicant does not identify, among those categories of fabrics, those which it considers to be similar to the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and those which are different from them. In those circumstances, it must be held that, by that single unsubstantiated claim, the applicant has not demonstrated the lack of similarity between the goods covered by the mark applied for and in Class 24, on the one hand, and the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18, on the other.

 The comparison of the signs

49      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression given by those signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

50      In order to assess the degree of similarity between the signs at issue, namely BRAMANI and BRAHMA, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 61 and 62 of the contested decision, that those signs had an average degree of distinctiveness and that they did not have a dominant element. The applicant does not dispute those findings.

 Visual similarity

51      In paragraph 69 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were visually similar to an average degree. In that regard, it found, first of all, that those signs shared the same sequence of letters ‘bra*ma**’, which appeared in the same order. The group of letters ‘bra’ occupies the same position in those signs and the group of letters ‘ma’ occupies a slightly different position within each of them. Next, the Board of Appeal found that the coincidence in the group of letters ‘bra’ was of particular significance on the ground that consumers tend to focus on the beginning of a sign. Lastly, it found that the differences between the signs at issue were not sufficient to remove the overall impression of visual similarity between those signs.

52      The applicant submits that the signs at issue are not visually similar on account of the different position of the group of common letters ‘ma’, the presence of the letter ‘h’ in the earlier sign and that of the group of letters ‘ni’ in the sign applied for. Moreover, the Board of Appeal is said to have placed excessive importance on the initial part of those signs, in view of the fact that the earlier sign BRAHMA is short and will not be abbreviated by the relevant consumer.

53      According to settled case-law, what matters in the assessment of the visual similarity of two word marks is, in particular, the presence, in each of them, of several letters in the same order (see judgment of 6 November 2024, Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO – Bioiberica (DAOgest), T‑396/23, not published, EU:T:2024:770, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). Similarly, the length of the signs at issue must be taken into account (see judgment of 26 November 2015, Junited Autoglas Deutschland v OHIM – United Vehicles (UNITED VEHICLEs), T‑404/14, not published, EU:T:2015:893, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

54      In the present case, it should first be noted that the signs at issue are composed of a single word element and that they are of a comparable length, namely seven letters in respect of the sign applied for BRAMANI and six letters in respect of the earlier sign BRAHMA.

55      Next, those signs coincide in five of their seven and six letters, that is to say in the groups of letters ‘bra’ and ‘ma’. Moreover, those groups of letters are in the same order within those signs and occupy an identical or similar position in them. The letters ‘b’, ‘r’ and ‘a’ occupy the first three positions in each sign and the letters ‘m’ and ‘a’ occupy the fourth and fifth positions in the earlier sign and the fifth and sixth positions in the sign applied for.

56      Lastly, the presence of the letter ‘h’ in the earlier sign and that of the group of letters ‘ni’ in the sign applied for is not sufficient to cancel out the similarity created by the overall impression given by those signs.

57      In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the signs at issue are visually similar to an average degree.

58      That finding is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that, in essence, the Board of Appeal relied on the fact that the average consumer would concentrate more on the beginning of the marks and did not take into account the overall impression given by them.

59      In that regard, it is sufficient to note that the assessment of the visual similarity between the signs at issue, as carried out in paragraphs 64 to 69 of the contested decision, is not based solely on the fact that those signs coincide in their initial parts. It was by taking into account the overall impression given by those signs – and in particular the number, position and order of the letters of which they consist – that the Board of Appeal found that they were visually similar to an average degree.

60      Similarly, the applicant cannot rely on the General Court’s finding in paragraph 40 of the judgment of 13 November 2024, Dyadema v EUIPO – Pegador (PEGADOR) (T‑1124/23, not published, EU:T:2024:801), according to which the signs at issue in the case which gave rise to that judgment were visually similar to a lower than average degree. That conclusion cannot be transposed to the present case, since the signs at issue in that case differ in six letters, namely in the letters ‘c’, ‘c’, ‘t’ and ‘e’ in the earlier mark PECCATORE and in the letters ‘g’ and ‘d’ in the mark applied for PEGADOR, whereas the signs at issue in the present case differ in only three letters, namely the letter ‘h’ in the earlier sign and the letters ‘n’ and ‘i’ in the sign applied for.

 Phonetic similarity

61      The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 72 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue had an above-average degree of phonetic similarity. In that regard it relied, inter alia, on the fact that the letter ‘h’, contained in the earlier sign, is silent in Spanish, with the result that the signs at issue differed only in the last syllable, ‘ni’, of the sign applied for. Such a difference would not offset the fact that the pronunciation of the earlier sign is fully included in the pronunciation of the sign applied for.

62      The applicant submits, in essence, that the common parts of the signs will sound different depending on whether or not the letter ‘h’ in the earlier sign BRAHMA is pronounced. In that regard, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the letter ‘h’ is silent in Spanish. Moreover, the signs at issue differ in their length and in particular on account of the presence of the syllable ‘ni’ in the sign applied for. Those differences relating to the number and accentuation of syllables create a different sound rhythm between those signs.

63      As regards, first of all, the applicant’s argument relating to the pronunciation of the letter ‘h’ in the earlier sign BRAHMA, the Court has already had occasion to find that, as a general rule, that letter is silent in Spanish (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 October 2015, Panrico v OHIM – HDN Development (Krispy Kreme DOUGHNUTS), T‑534/13, not published, EU:T:2015:751, paragraph 48, and of 21 February 2024, Hoffmann v EUIPO – Moldex/Metric (Holex), T‑767/22, not published, EU:T:2024:108, paragraph 64).

64      Admittedly, when the letter ‘h’ appears in a foreign word, it may, in certain circumstances, be pronounced by Spanish-speaking members of the public even though it does not belong to the Spanish phonological system (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2015, CareAbout v OHIM – Florido Rodríguez (Kerashot), T‑356/14, not published, EU:T:2015:978, paragraph 62, and of 30 April 2025, Mobility Trader v EUIPO – Cala and Ruiz (hey car select), T‑338/24, not published, EU:T:2025:420, paragraph 64). However, that possibility concerns only the part of the Spanish-speaking public which is familiar with the foreign language in question or, at the very least, with the rules of pronunciation of that language (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2015, Kerashot, T‑356/14, not published, EU:T:2015:978, paragraph 62, and of 30 April 2025, hey car select, T‑338/24, not published, EU:T:2025:420, paragraph 64).

65      Thus, even if the letter ‘h’ in the word ‘brahma’ were pronounced according to the rules of pronunciation of the language in question, the applicant has not submitted any evidence to the Court to show that the Spanish-speaking public would be familiar with those rules.

66      In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that that public will not pronounce the letter ‘h’ in that sign.

67      Next, it should be noted that the sign applied for BRAMANI is composed of three syllables, namely ‘bra’, ‘ma’ and ‘ni’, and that the earlier sign BRAHMA is composed of two syllables, namely ‘brah’ and ‘ma’, it being understood that the first of those syllables will be pronounced ‘bra’ as the ‘h’ is silent.

68      It follows that the phonetic element ‘brama’ is common to the signs at issue. The fact that the earlier mark is phonetically wholly included in the mark applied for is liable to create a strong phonetic similarity between such signs (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 April 2016, Gervais Danone v EUIPO – Mahou (B’lue), T‑803/14, not published, EU:T:2016:251, paragraph 51, and of 17 May 2023, Panicongelados-Massas Congeladas v EUIPO – Seder (panidor), T‑480/22, not published, EU:T:2023:266, paragraph 47).

69      It is true that, as the applicant submits, the presence of the syllable ‘ni’ in the sign applied for is likely to have some impact on the overall phonetic impression of that sign and in particular on its accentuation and rhythm of pronunciation.

70      However, the fact that the number of syllables is different is not sufficient to conclude that there is no phonetic similarity between two signs (see judgment of 2 April 2025, Porczyńska v EUIPO – Gap (ITM) (gappol), T‑44/24, not published, EU:T:2025:356, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited), even where those signs differ in their accentuation or rhythm of pronunciation (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 September 2009, Hipp & Co v OHIM – Laboratorios Ordesa (Bebimil), T‑221/06, not published, EU:T:2009:330, paragraph 51, and of 19 May 2011, PJ Hungary v OHIM – Pepekillo (PEPEQUILLO), T‑580/08, EU:T:2011:227, paragraph 79). That is the case in particular where a sign is included in its entirety in the other sign (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 13 November 2024, SC Certinvest v EUIPO – Kiddinx Studios (Tina), T‑444/23, not published, EU:T:2024:826, paragraphs 55 and 56).

71      That is the case in respect of the signs at issue in the present case, where the pronunciation of the earlier sign is included in its entirety in the pronunciation of the sign applied for. Moreover, those signs coincide phonetically in two of the three syllables which make up the sign applied for.

72      It follows that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the phonetic differences between those signs do not outweigh their phonetic similarities.

73      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the signs at issue had an above-average degree of phonetic similarity.

74      That conclusion is not invalidated by the applicant’s argument based on the judgment of 13 November 2024, PEGADOR (T‑1124/23, not published, EU:T:2024:801), from which it follows that the average consumer, who is reasonably observant and circumspect, would easily notice the differences between those sounds.

75      There is no reason to transpose to the present case the finding in the judgment of 13 November 2024, PEGADOR (T‑1124/23, not published, EU:T:2024:801, paragraphs 47 and 48) according to which the signs at issue in the case which gave rise to that judgment were phonetically similar to a lower than average degree. Those signs and the signs at issue in the present case are not comparable. In the case which gave rise to that judgment, the signs at issue coincided only in their syllable ‘pe’ and differed in all other syllables, namely ‘ca’, ‘to’ and ‘re’ in respect of the earlier sign PECCATORE and ‘ga’ and ‘dor’ in respect of the sign applied for PEGADOR. By contrast, in the present case, the signs at issue coincide phonetically in two syllables, namely ‘bra’ and ‘ma’, and differ only in the syllable ‘ni’ in the sign applied for.

 Conceptual comparison

76      In paragraph 73 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the conceptual comparison was neutral or not possible on account of the fact that neither of the signs at issue had a meaning for the relevant public.

77      The applicant submits that such a comparison is possible and that the signs at issue are conceptually dissimilar. On the one hand, the relevant public will perceive the sign BRAHMA as a Hindu word that is linked to the Hindu caste system and refers to a Hindu god. That sign therefore has a clear meaning which is capable of neutralising any similarity between the signs at issue. On the other, the sign BRAMANI has no meaning or is perceived as an Italian surname.

78      According to the case-law, the conceptual comparison between marks is neutral when they have no meaning for the relevant public (see judgment of 29 April 2020, Abarca v EUIPO – Abanca Corporación Bancaria (ABARCA SEGUROS), T‑106/19, not published, EU:T:2020:158, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

79      As regards, first, the meaning of the sign BRAHMA, it is true that part of the relevant public will understand it as referring to Hindu culture, or even to the Hindu god Brahma.

80      However, the applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to the Court to demonstrate that that part of the relevant Spanish-speaking public is significant. In that regard, it submitted a screenshot of a Google search using the keywords ‘brahma diccionario español’, as well as an extract from Wikipedia and some online dictionaries relating to the term ‘brahma’.

81      As the Board of Appeal rightly found in paragraph 60 of the contested decision, the mere inclusion of the word ‘brahma’ in such dictionaries does not rule out the possibility that at least a non-negligible part of the Spanish-speaking public will not understand the meaning of that term. As this is a term belonging to a specific vocabulary, such as that of Hinduism, the mere presence of that term in a general Spanish dictionary does not mean that the Spanish-speaking public can be assumed to have a widespread knowledge of that term (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 September 2023, Korres v EUIPO – Naos (EST. KORRES 1996 HYDRA-BIOME), T‑328/22, not published, EU:T:2023:533, paragraph 64).

82      In those circumstances, the evidence referred to in paragraph 80 above alone is not sufficient to rule out the possibility that a non-negligible part of the Spanish-speaking public will not understand the term ‘brahma’ as a Hindu word and will not attribute any meaning to it.

83      As regards, secondly, the sign applied for BRAMANI, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the applicant admits that that sign has no meaning for the relevant public. On the other hand, in so far as it submits that such a sign could be perceived as an Italian surname, it has not established, or even claimed, that such a meaning would be understood by a significant part of the Spanish-speaking public.

84      In those circumstances, it must be held that, for a non-negligible part of the relevant public at least, the sign applied for BRAMANI will have no meaning.

85      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the conceptual comparison between the marks at issue was neutral.

 The distinctive character of the earlier mark

86      In paragraph 79 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark enjoys a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness. The applicant does not dispute that assessment.

 The likelihood of confusion

87      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors, and in particular a similarity between the trade marks and between these goods or services. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

88      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue for the relevant public, even taking into account the fact that part of the relevant public may display a high level of attention.

89      The applicant submits that there is no likelihood of confusion in respect of any of the goods at issue. In any event, the likelihood of confusion must be ruled out, at the very least, in respect of the goods in Class 24 referred to in paragraph 21 above, which the Board of Appeal found to be aimed at a professional public.

90      In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first of all, that the earlier mark has an average degree of distinctiveness (see paragraph 86 above). Moreover, the signs at issue are visually similar to an average degree, phonetically similar to an above-average degree and the conceptual comparison between those signs is neutral (see paragraphs 57, 73 and 85 above).

91      As regards, next, the goods in Class 24 referred to in paragraph 21 above, those goods are similar to an average degree to the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18 (see paragraph 40 above).

92      It is true that those goods are intended for the professional Spanish-speaking public in the textile, fashion or manufacturing sectors with a high level of attention (see paragraph 21 above).

93      However, the fact that part of the relevant public will display a high level of attention when examining the mark does not mean that it will examine the mark applied for down to the smallest detail, or that it will compare that mark in minute detail to the earlier mark. Even for a public displaying a high level of attention, it remains the case that the average consumer only rarely has the opportunity to compare the different marks directly, but must rely on his or her imperfect recollection of them (see judgment of 10 November 2021, Stada Arzneimittel v EUIPO – Pfizer (RUXYMLA), T‑248/20, not published, EU:T:2021:772, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

94      In those circumstances, and in view of the earlier mark’s normal degree of inherent distinctiveness and the similarity between the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal was right to find that there was a likelihood of confusion – for a non-negligible part of the relevant public at least – in relation to the contested goods in Class 24 referred to in paragraph 21 above, on the one hand, and the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18, on the other.

95      Furthermore, the same conclusion must be reached with regard to the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for and referred to in paragraph 23 above. Even if those goods were intended for a professional public, as the applicant claims, it should be noted, first, that, in paragraph 85 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue even taking into account that part of the relevant public may display a high level of attention. Secondly, like the goods in Class 24 referred to in paragraph 21 above, the goods in Class 24 referred to in paragraph 23 above are similar to an average degree to the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18 (see paragraph 40 above). It must therefore be held, for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 91 to 94 above, that there is also a likelihood of confusion for the professional public in relation to the goods in Class 24 covered by the mark applied for and referred to in paragraph 23 above and the goods ‘leather and imitations of leather’ covered by the earlier mark and in Class 18.

96      Lastly, as regards the goods covered by the mark applied for and in Class 25, those goods are intended for the general public, whose level of attention is average (see paragraph 20 above). Moreover, those goods are partly identical and partly similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark and also in Class 25 (see paragraph 28 above).

97      In those circumstances, and in view of the normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark, as well as the similarity between the signs at issue, it must be held that there is a likelihood of confusion, for a non-negligible part of the relevant public at least, in relation to those goods.

98      In the light of all the foregoing, the Board of Appeal was right to find, in paragraph 87 of the contested decision, that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.

99      The single plea in law relied on by the applicant must thus be rejected and, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need to rule on the objections of inadmissibility raised by EUIPO.

 Costs

100    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

101    Even though the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is arranged. Since no hearing was held, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders each party to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 25 February 2026.